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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PREFACE
From time immemorial, warriors have trained to do battle. Now, with global
threats diminished, our own management systems largely have become the enemy; they
are replete with inefficiencies and problems at every level. This thesis discusses a newly
adopted approach to improving the financial management systems used for funding
defense support activities. This approach is called unit cost resourcing. The objective
of the unit cost resourcing system is to create a more "business-like" environment for
Department of Defense support activities (e.g., supply and medical) and to encourage
more efficient and effective production by providing new incentives to managers. Such
changes are intended to improve provision of services and materia' s supporting the
operating forces. This chapter discusses current conditions facing the Department of
Defense (DoD), how unit cost resourcing became adopted as the system of choice and
previews the remainder of the thesis.
B. WORLD CHANGE AND DOD
Dramatic world political changes and major domestic problems have reshaped our
geo-political environment. In doing so, such changes have established the need for
changes of equal dimensions within the United States military establishment. The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act set the stage for the Department Of Defense (DoD) budget
decline that started in 1985. Other recent and profound events have amplified public and
Congressional cries for significant reductions in DoD force structure and funding. This
has become popularly known as the "peace dividend."
Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika policy and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
were among the first in the cataclysmic chain of events leading to the communist Party's
radically diminished power and eventual collapse in Eastern Europe. These events
helped enable passage of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990, which assures
further DoD budget reductions until 1995 by establishing DoD budget targets. The
Congressionally mandated budget limits translate to a five percent real decrease annually
in DoD Budget Authority (BA) through fiscal year 1995.
Even more recently, the failed Soviet communist coupe attempt (September 1991)
prompted President Bush to plan for the U.S. to unilaterally reduce nuclear arms (27
September 1991). This followed the announcement by President Gorbachev (4 October
1991) of similar Soviet nuclear arms reductions accompanied by a 20% reduction of the
3.7 million man Soviet army. To many, these events, combined with continuing huge
federal deficits, have more intensely fueled the public and Congressional mandate for
DoD to tangibly produce the "peace dividend." DoD is painfully learning to
accommodate these political realities.
C. WHY THE DOD BUDGET DECLINES
There are three primary reasons that DoD is the main focus for budget reductions,
including: (1) the size of the DoD budget, (2) the change in the perceived threat and (3)
the alleged inefficiencies within DoD.
1. DOD SPENDING IS DISCRETIONARY
DoD appropriations have accounted for about 25% of the annual federal
budget since 1984. However, those appropriations have constituted over 65% of
Congressional "discretionary spending 1 " when entitlements, such as Social Security and
social programs, are subtracted from the federal budget. Generally speaking, entitlement
programs are politically "untouchable" because they affect a large sector of the
population and recipients are often retired or people who require government-provided
assistance. Thus, when Congress looks to reduce "discretionary funds," DoD bears a
disproportionate share of reductions when compared to other agencies. This will likely
continue for the foreseeable future.
2. THREATS FUEL NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGETS
Historically, the DoD budget has been tied directly to the Congressionally
perceived threat. A review of the DoD budget since 1930 (Figure 1) confirms this
notion. Logically, defense spending increases substantially during wartime. But the
"Discretionary spending is defmed as expenditures of public funds Congress
appropriated and chose to make. These include most of costs of operating the
government. Mandatory spending is outlays that may or may not be appropriated, but
which the government is obligated to pay. Examples include Social Security, national
debt service and military pensions.
subtle Cold War influence and advancing Soviet military technology and strength in the
1970s and 1980s convinced President Reagan and his advisors that Soviet intentions were
malicious. President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
able to persuade Congress that the U. S. did not have adequate defense resources to
guard against potential communist hostilities. Thus, the DoD peacetime budget increased
at the unparalleled real rate of nearly 12% annually. Real GNP increased at an average
2.5% during the same period. Simply stated, the DoD budget grew at a faster rate than
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Figure 1
Given the current diminished Soviet threat previously discussed, the primary threat
is now perceived as one of regional conflicts (e.g., Desert Shield/Storm). Many consider
the risk of global nuclear war nearly non-existent. The battle lines have become budget
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lines. It is obvious that political realities have inevitably mandated DoD resource
reductions.
3. INEFFICIENCY MEANS LESS RESOURCES
The last, and perhaps most serious threat to DoD funding is the continuing
charge of DoD inefficiency and management problems. Inefficiency threatens DoD in
two ways: inefficiency wastes limited resources that could be used elsewhere; and, while
government operations are inherently inefficient (Stigler, 1963,pp. 35-41), an increasingly
common response to inefficient managers has been to reduce their resource allocations
in hopes that the reduced resource (funding) base will encourage efficiency management.
A startling example of a service directed action was when Navy Secretary Lehaman
directed a $500 million reduction in the Naval Industrial Fund (NTF) in 1985 after
receiving a Coopers and Lybrand NIF audit report alleging poor resource management
at public Navy shipyards. (While it is not clear the reduction itself was instrumental in
improving NIF operations, the message sent to NIF activity managers was clear; improve
efficiency or risk losing funds.)
D. RESPONSES TO DECLINING RESOURCES
Essentially, there are three methods that organizations can exercise to respond to
a declining resource environment: vertical cuts, horizontal cuts and efficiency
improvements.
In a vertical cut, a function is totally eliminated so that resources associated with
that function are no longer required. In the past, this approach has been used limitedly
within DoD, and usually after a buildup such as with Viet Nam. In today's environment,
the vertical cut approach has become an important way for DoD to downsize force
structure. But current issues, such as base closure decisions, have tended to be political
in nature. DoD managers generally do not have unilateral authority for vertical cut
decisions.
In a horizontal cut, all or many functions receive about an equal share of the
resource reduction, as in the proverbial "5 % across-the-board cut. " This approach makes
life harder for all; but those with "fat" will be less affected than those operating close to
the margin. Horizontal cuts have been used frequently since 1985 in helping DoD reach
its lowered budgets targets. This approach is often favored in political circles since no
functions are eliminated. The responsibility for operating with lower budgets is
transferred to lower level functional managers who must accomplish mission goals with
reduced resources.
Good managers maintain mission success by implementing a third alternative,
efficiency improvements. Efficiency improvements (also known as productivity
improvements) are management or process changes intended to accomplish the same
mission, but in a resource-wise manner that maintains or improves output (quantity and
or quality) while using less resources. This approach is the focus of the unit cost
resourcing system.
E. DECLINING RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT
In response to declining resources and recommendations for improvements raised
in various forums, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD): and the component
services are currently involved in a variety of major management reforms to improve
operational efficiency and instill public confidence in the DoD establishment. These
reforms are a direct result of the Presidential Productivity Improvement Plan (PIP),
submitted to Congress in July of 1989. The PIP provided a comprehensive plan under
which the executive branch would improve operations and reduce costs. A DoD-wide
Defense Management Review (DMR) process assessed defense functions. As a result of
the DMR process, DoD has estimated it will save 72 billion dollars in defense spending
from FY 1991 through FY 1997.
DoD reforms approved by OSD in the DMR process have been distributed as
Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRD). The DMRDs have initiated changes
in basic ways of doing business. One of the primary focuses of the initial DMRD actions
was OSD oversight and consolidation of similar, sendee-performed support functions.
Some examples of those DMR decisions are the consolidations of functional areas for:
accounting and finance, supply operations, computer centers, military training, civilian
personnel administration, communications and commissary operations. Savings are
expected to accrue through reducing personnel and process improvements. The DoD
2OSD refers collectively to the civilian and miliary leaders in charge at the DoD
level. DoD refers collectively to the military departments, the Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the defence agencies. These organizations are refereed to as the
"components," and the military services are referred to as "component services."
closely monitors implementation of the DMR decisions and periodically reports progress
to the President and Congress.
DoD has also implemented other significant management changes to improve
efficiency. Among them, and the focus of this thesis, is a resource allocation system
based on determining the cost per unit of output. This is called Unit Cost Resourcing.
F. UNIT COST: A MANAGEMENT EVOLUTION
For the DoD to meet the demands of downsizing while still accomplishing its
national security mission requires skillful and coordinated management. DoD
management has undertaken a productivity improvement effort by embracing the unit cost
resourcing system. This system provides operating funds to support organizations
(supply, medical, etc.) by establishing a producer-customer relationship between support
organizations (producers) and operational military units (consumers). The producers
"sell" their output at an established price (the unit cost) to the consumers. Thus, the
support organizations "earn" the value (cost) of their output from their customers. This
system is drastically different from the traditional DoD resource allocation system of
providing support organizations fixed budgets to accomplish their missions.
The concepts behind unit cost are not new. Unit cost as an integrated DoD-wide
system is an evolution of older ideas into current management systems. This approach
to management is as foreign to some areas within the component services as a market-
based economy is to the Soviet Union. None the less, both will become fully
implemented realities within the next few years.
OSD leaders contend that the unit cost resourcing system will move the DoD
operations and support functions to a more business-like setting. This action will
enhance visibility of costs and contribute to improved resource management. Its
implementation was urgent given the declining resource environment for DoD. Unit cost
proponents also stated that managing DoD functions in a business-like manner will
improve the DoD image and credibility to the public and Congress.
G. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
This thesis strives to attain four objectives: the first is to briefly review the history
of defense resource allocation and budgeting systems. This review shows that ideas
similar to the unit cost concept were considered as possible resource allocation methods
since at least the early 1930s. This portion of the thesis is based on a literature review.
Secondly, the issues in implementing the unit costing initiative will be examined.
This thesis will specifically focus on Navy implementation in three of the functional areas
where OSD has directed that unit cost resourcing be used. These areas are supply
depots, supply operations (combined into one discussion) and medical. Recruiting will
be briefly mentioned. Though no less important, analyzing the other functions is beyond
the scope of this thesis. This research is based on document reviews and interviews with
key DoD and Navy leaders as well as field level personnel responsible for implementing
unit cost resourcing.
Thirdly, the unit cost system will be analyzed within a microeconomics conceptual
framework. This view will enable readers to understand basic principles of the unit cost
system from a theoretical economic perspective. This view may help explain practical
uses and system limitations. This portion of the research is based on a combination of
a literature review and a survey of DoD guidance.
Lastly, the thesis will review the OSD method of allocating Base Operations
Support costs which will become part of an activity unit cost goal. This part of the
research involved interaction with personnel at the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC) to understand the unit cost system design. Field research also provided data
to compare to DMDC reports.
H. LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS
Unit cost resourcing is. in its current form, a new DoD-wide concept. As such,
much of what is presented in this thesis is a synthesis of reactions, impressions and
predictions rather than an analysis of "hard data" leading to an irrefutable conclusion.
In developing and implementing unit cost resourcing, the OSD civilian leadership
has expressed their view of how DoD may best meet the present, future and ever
changing fiscal environment. Unit cost is a part of a much larger body of DoD-wide
management and process changes intended to realign the military establishment to meet
the challenge of a changing world. Changes in DoD management process have taken
place at unprecedented speed. As a result, documentation is poor, fragmented and not
well disseminated. One OSD analyst noted that changes are changed before the first
change is published.
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I. PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS
The remaining thesis chapters are organized as follows:
1. Chapter H. HISTORY OF DoD RESOURCE ALLOCATION METHODS
provides a historical perspective of how DoD allocated resources and traces the history
of the unit cost concept.
2. Chapter m. THE UNIT COST RESOURCING SYSTEM provides a
discussion of the theory and mechanics of the unit cost resourcing system.
3. Chapter IV. NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIT COST provides a
general discussion of implementation problems and a review, by functional area, of
actions and progress in unit cost implementation in Navy organizations. A discussion of
current status and future direction is also provided.
4. Chapter V. UNIT COST: A MICROECONOMIC VIEW reviews and
analyzes the unit cost concept within a microeconomic framework.
5. Chapter VI. BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT (BOS) COSTS discusses and
analyzes base operations costs and discusses changes from traditional practices to the new
unit cost resourcing system.
6. Chapter VH. DATA ANALYSIS OF BOS ALLOCATION compares and
discusses field data allocated by the DoD method to an example of an alternate allocation
method.
7. Chapter VOL SUMMARY provides conclusions and addresses areas for
further study.
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n. HISTORY OF DOD RESOURCE ALLOCATION
This chapter provides a historical perspective of efforts to modify the DoD
resource allocation system and describes some of the results of those methods.
A. MILITARY BUDGETING PRIOR TO 1980
Formal budgeting and resource allocation did not exist in the United States
government until the Budget and Accounting Act of 1920 was passed in 1921. Prior to
that time, the Federal government allocated operating funds on a month-to-month basis.
The Act provided for planned budgeting and resource allocation in the form of annual
appropriations. (Kramer, 1979, p. 10) The Act, however, did not integrate military plans
with their respective budgets. Until post-World War II, military officers planned battles;
civilians planned budgets. Coordination between the two was poor, resulting in
inadequate war preparations. (Mosher, 1954,pp. 27-53)
The first major move to improve coordination between resource and military
planning, and among all levels of the services, was the National Security Act of 1947.
The Act created the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). It was amended in 1949
under the National Security Reorganization Act to create the Department of Defense
(DoD) as an Executive Department. The 1949 amendment also downgraded the Military
Departments, and elevated SECDEF to a cabinet level position. (Clark, 1969, p. 174-175)
Even so, the Military Departments acted in an independent and sometimes uncoordinated
manner. OSD was unable to effectively manage the DoD components as an integrated
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department until after 1958. The 1953 Reorganization Plan No. 6, expanded the OSD
staff and authority; and, the Reorganization Act of 1958, shifted significant responsibility
from the services to OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Gates, 1989, p. 2) Both of these
changes were based on Hoover Commission Report recommendations.
It is in the 1947-1953 timeframe that the basis for unit cost in its present form
emerges. At about the time Congress established OSD, they also established the first
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, more popularly known as the
Hoover Commission, since former President Herbert Hoover chaired the Commission.
Formed by the Lodge-Brown Act of July 1947, the Act defined a formidable and broad
task for the Commission: "to review and recommend changes to the executive branch of
government." (McGraw Hill, 1949, p.vi)
Among the hundreds of recommendations, the Hoover Commission Report urged
that the Federal government adopt "performance budgeting." This was necessary, the
Report stated, because "The Federal budget is an inadequate document, poorly organized
and improperly designed to serve its major purpose..." (McGraw Hill, 1949, p. 35)
Describing the benefits of performance budgeting, the Report stated:
Under performance budgeting, attention is centered on the function or
activity-on the accomplishment of the purpose-instead of on lists of employees or
authorizations of purchases. In reality, this method of budgeting concentrates
Congressional action and executive direction on the scope and magnitude of the
different Federal activities. It places both accomplishment and cost in a clear light
before the Congress and the public.
Clearly, the authors of the Report considered knowing the full cost of an activity
important. The Report goes on to provide several specific examples (including one on
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Navy medicine) and, within the concept of knowing total costs, described a "cost per"
concept. Mr. W. J. McNeil, the first DoD Comptroller, implemented the Hoover
Commission recommendations by making performance-based budgeting the keystone of
the DoD resource allocation method. However, this performance-based budgeting did
not concentrate on the "cost per" concept. Although the Hoover Commission seemingly
defmed the concept of unit cost, OSD took no specific actions to allocate fiscal resources
on this basis.
Finding significant merit in the Hoover Commission budget and accounting
recommendations. Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.
The Act put into practice most of the first Hoover Commission Report budget-related
recommendations. The second Hoover Commission, active from 1953-1955, found that
while performance budgeting was generally used in most agencies, it "has encountered
some difficulties and some congressional dissatisfaction with respect to program
classification and the accounting support for them." (MacNeil & Metz, 1956, pp. 50-55)
DoD budgeting underwent few substantive changes until Robert MacNamara was
appointed Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Secretary MacNamara introduced the
Planning. Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1961, which K. C. Clarke and
L. J. Legere believed to be the result of an evolving process since 1947. (Clark &
Legere, 1969, p. 176) Describing PPBS, Aaron Waildavsky writes, "The general idea
is that budgetary decisions should be made by focusing on output categories like
government goals, objectives and end products instead of on inputs like personnel,
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equipment, and maintenance." (Waildavsky, 1984, p. 186) PPBS remains the
fundamental DoD planning framework today, similar in substance to its original form.
The fmal product of PPBS is the DoD input of fixed budgets by functional area to
the President's Budget. Generally, Congress appropriates DoD budgets, with only
marginal changes from the President's Budget. (Penner & Abramson, 1988,pp. 85-89)
As such, PPBS is a prospective system. While there are many changes to budgets within
the execution phase, the PPBS resource allocation mechanism only limitedly relates the
execution and budgeting phases of the budget.
During the budgeting phase of PPBS, managers and organizations with fixed
budgets historically have been evaluated on whether they successfully obligated their
appropriated budgets, not on how much it cost to produce their output. Also,
organizations risked receiving reduced budgets if they underspent their prior year
appropriated funds. This was (and remains) a particularly serious issue for organizations
that received one-year appropriations since funds are not available for obligation after the
fiscal year ends. 3 In practice this resource allocation and management system
encouraged the "use it or lose it" mentality, and was partially responsible for the need
for top level managers to focus on productivity and efficiency. (GAO, 1984, pp. 3-10)
The next major change affecting DoD budgeting was the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974. This Act made sweeping changes in the way Congress
3Appropriations are Congressional Acts that enable an agency or department to (1)
make spending commitments (obligations) and (2) spend money. There are different
types of appropriations which remain available for obligation for as little as one year or
as long as five.
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analyzed and approved budgetary matters. (Penner, 1988, p. 5) Among many other
requirements, the Act required the President's Budget to display DoD budgets in terms
of missions, establishing the mission budget concept. A General Accounting Office
(GAO) Report describes mission budgets (GAO, 1980, p. 63):
A mission budget links an agency's "mission," to its activities and proposed
funding. Descending levels of the structure then focus more sharply on specific
purposes, needs, and programs to satisfy them. The new concept also illuminates
the early (front end) decisions that control the purpose and direction of all
programs.
While this concept conveys the concern that inputs should be linked to outputs, its
intentions are far broader. Under mission budgeting, missions are defined in broad
terms, such as "Strategic Programs," which cover programs in all service and agency
components of the DoD. Such budgeting may provide a useful tool for Congressional
oversight of DoD functions, but is of little use to lower level managers concerned with
a particular system. Thus, DoD budget requirements must be translated from the
functional service areas to the Congressionally required mission budgets. Mission
budgeting does little to promote activity level efficiency or productivity, serving instead
to provide information in an orderly display for Congressional review.
Problems of inefficiency continued to be recognized and in 1979 OSD reissued the
Productivity Program Directive. According to DoD Directive 5010.31 of April 1979,
Subject: DoD Productivity Program policy:
1
.
The DoD Productivity Program will focus management attention on achieving
maximum Defense outputs within available resource levels by systematically
seeking out and exploiting opportunities for improved methods of operation, in
consonance with the Defense Preparedness mission.
2. Productivity measurement, enhancement and evaluation will be an integral
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element of resource management; that is, planning, programming, budgeting,
accounting and reporting system.
3. The DoD Productivity Program is a labor oriented program. Therefore, the
primary basis for productivity assessment will be labor productivity measurement.
Labor productivity measurement is a subset of total factor productivity or unit cost
measurement. Where adequate cost information is available, total factor or unit
cost measures may be used in addition to labor based productivity.
4. Productivity enhancement will focus on labor cost savings as well as
reduction in unit cost of operations. The savings should be reutilized at the lowest
organizational level practical to provide an incentive for management.
B. THE REAGAN YEARS
In the early 1980s, as a consequence of the Reagan-prompted DoD budget growth,
the huge national debt became the most critical challenge facing Congress and the
President. On 30 June 1982, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12369. The EO
created the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC). The PPSSCC,
better known as the "Grace Commission," since it was headed by J. Peter Grace, the
President of Grace Industries, was tasked with determining and recommending deficit
reduction measures. The Commission identified 784 issues and developed 2,478
associated recommendations consisting of 47 volumes addressing federal programs and
operations government-wide. The Grace Commission estimated that the identified
recommendations, if implemented, would save almost 425 billion dollars over a three
year period.
A key issue of the Grace Commission Report was to improve and integrate
executive branch accounting and budgeting systems and thereby improve the quality of
information available for instituting management improvements, reducing costs, and
minimizing agency exposure to fraud, waste, and abuse.
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In a review of the Grace Commission Reports, (GAO, 1985, p. 12), the GAO
agreed with the Commission's recommendations regarding the budgeting and accounting
system, but stated "such initiatives would not produce the full range of improvements
needed in federal financial management." The GAO report went on to provide a
conceptual framework for financial management which included the following:
Budget and account on the same basis . Provide a common set of rules so managers
can make valid comparisons between planned (budgeted) and actual (accounting)
results.
Use accounting principles that match the delivery of services with associated cost .
Use accrual accounting principles to provide policy makers and managers consistent
information to compare costs or agencies with minimal interperiod distortions.
Measure outputs as well as inputs . Incorporate performance measurements that
relate costs with outputs to determine if objectives are achieved at an acceptable
cost.
As in the Hoover Commission Reports, GAO clearly defines a theme of relating inputs
to outputs. Also, by invoking the notion of accrual accounting, GAO similarly included
the concept of needing to know total cost.
While efficiency was at the heart of many DoD issues, so too was effectiveness.
DoD leaders became concerned over the large amount of end-of-year (EOY) spending.
One study found that during the last month of the fiscal year, the DoD obligation rate
was one hundred and twenty percent of the monthly average. (Sherwood, 1977, p. 87)
Many factors contributed to disproportionate end-of-year spending, including late
appropriations from Congress, complexity of DoD acquisitions and the "use or loose it"
actions described earlier. OSD felt that the rapid DoD budget growth could exacerbate
the naturally high EOY obligation rate and cause Congress to accuse the military
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departments of needless spending. In 1984, these concerns became so great that OSD
required the service secretaries to personally grant approval for major contracts placed
during the last month of that fiscal year.
In 1985, political pressures focused on the rapid budget growth and inefficiency of
DoD. As defense outlays accelerated, the National debt climbed steadily. This
environment enabled the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act of 1985 to succeed. To
address the rapid budget growth the Act attributed 50% of the GRH cuts to defense.
(Penner & Abransom,1988,p. 70) Although not a primary consideration for GRH,
cutting the "military fat" would also encourage more efficient operations.
Foreseeing the need to improve productivity and efficiency in executive agencies
overall, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12552 on 25 February 1986. This
Order outlined a Productivity Improvement Program for the Federal Government. The
Order sought, among other goals, to achieve a "20 percent productivity increase in
appropriate functions by 1992." Federal agencies were required to submit a productivity
plan; DoD called its version the Productivity Improvement Plan (PIP).
Responding to this Executive Order (EO) and DoD PIP, Mr. Donald Shycoff, then
the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Productivity Principal, implemented a "cost per
output" system at DLA depots in 1987. DLA used the system to monitor and compare
costs at the different depots. The system was implemented at the DLA inventory control
points in 1989. The other DoD components also instituted cost per output systems.
However, the cost per output systems were neither uniform nor centrally managed. They
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were developed to satisfy directed reporting requirements rather than for use as
management tools.
In April 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order (EO) 12637 which
superceeded EO 12552. EO 12637 was more ambitious in intent and requirements than
EO 12552. It required an annual average 3 percent productivity improvement in
appropriate functions by 1991. It also provided specific definitions of terms in the EO.
The EO:
...established a government-wide program to improve the quality, timeliness and
efficiency of services provided by the Federal Government. The goal of the
program shall be to improve the quality and timeliness of services to the public and
to achieve an annual average productivity increase of 3 percent in appropriate
functions.
Section 2 of the EO defines productivity, appropriate functions, public and outputs.
This thesis will use the definitions as provided in the EO:
Sec. 2. As used in this Order, the term:
(a) "Productivity" means the efficiency with which resources are used to
produce a government service or product at specified levels of quality and
timeliness;
(b) "Appropriate functions" means those agency program functions that produce
measurable outputs in the form of services to the public;
(c) "Public" means a consumer outside the organization, such as citizens,
businesses, State and local governments, other countries and/or their citizens, other
agencies, the military;
(d) "Outputs" means products or services delivered to the public.
The sheer size and cost of DoD dictated that a concerted effort focusing on
improving efficiency and productivity be implemented. As a federal agency, in FY
1990, DoD operated 485 domestic and 136 foreign or territorial installations that
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accounted for 26.5 billion dollars of Base Operating Support costs. 4 (DoD Base Structure
Report, 1990, pp. 6-7) Executive Orders 12552 and 12637 and the need to improve
DoD resource management paved the way for DoD-wide unit cost resourcing.
C. POST REAGAN TO PRESENT
President Bush, by a Presidential memo of 26 July 1989, selected agency-provided
candidates for inclusion into an Executive Management By Objective (MBO) system.
The goal of the Presidential MBO system was to help implement Executive Order 12637,
aimed at improving productivity and quality in Federal government. OSD proposed
implementing a cost per unit output system as part of the DoD response to the President's
request.
Mr. Shycoff moved from DLA and became the Principal Deputy Comptroller for
DoD in 1989. He envisioned the unit cost system could be a DoD-wide system modeled
on the DLA system. In July 1989, the President submitted the Productivity Improvement
Plan to Congress and made the Shycoff vision reality. By a DoD Comptroller
memorandum of 10 August 1989 (Shycoff) formally announced to DoD components that
OSD leaders were committed to the development and implementation of a Financial
Management System based on cost per unit of output.
The memorandum summarized the problems with existing DoD component
reporting and emphasized the need for managing with austere environment by saying:
4Base Operating Support (BOS) is a category of the DoD component Operations and
Maintenance appropriations. BOS is used for operating military installations.
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Our review clearly indicates the lack of a consistent approach to this effort [cost
per output] and a failure, for the most part, to incorporate this approach into the
financial management system of the Department. ...we should use the same
identification of inputs/outputs for making resourcing decisions and management
decisions concerning performance, productivity, and quality improvement. ...we
should use the same inputs/outputs for similar functions throughout the Department.
The financial system should be the catalyst that supports all decisions...
If we are to minimize the impact of constrained resource levels, we must change
the environment and culture that exits at many of our activities. We face the
difficult task of convincing managers and workers that they should strive to reduce
their costs, and thus, be able to meet mission goals with lower budgets. We can
only get them to accept that goal when budgets are expressed in cost per output
terms and we demonstrate to employees that they are not personally threatened, nor
are the quality and performance of their organizations threatened by lower budgets.
To the contrary, they should be rewarded for exceeding quality and performance
goals, and reducing costs.
In 1989, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, California was
designated the Central Design Agency (CDA). Tasking as CDA required DMDC to
develop the standard DoD data base using the component data necessary to support the
unit cost concept. Development of the system was under the direct control of the DoD
Comptroller, Directorate of Management Improvement (DMI), located in the Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.
From August 1989 to September 1990, with SECDEF's concurrence, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and Principal Deputy Comptroller repeatedly reaffirmed the DoD
commitment to PIP and unit cost resourcing. Then, in a 15 October 1990 memorandum,
the DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller declared "Implementation of the unit cost system
of resourcing is underway with the execution of FY 1991 operation." (Comptroller of the
Department of Defense, 1990, p. 1)
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HI. UNIT COST RESOURCING
This chapter provides a description of the unit resourcing system, explains how the
concept works and discusses Defense Management Review Decision 971 which includes
certain DoD business areas in the unit cost system.
A. THE UNIT COST RESOURCING CONCEPT
Figure 2 graphically depicts the unit cost resourcing concept, which is theoretically
simple. All costs incurred in a functional support area are accumulated to determine a






























total cost. The total cost is then divided by the total expected work load or output. The
resultant cost is a cost per unit of output, or the unit cost.
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To use the unit cost as a resource allocation system, the calculated unit cost
becomes the "price" activities receive for their output. "Consumers" pay the price (unit
cost) which in turn becomes the operating funds or earnings for the producer or seller
of goods and services. Producers get paid only for actual output, so a loss or profit from
operations can result which is absorbed by "revolving funds," described later.
A DLA document, entitled "Unit Cost Resourcing Policies and Procedure," dated
15 October 1988, defines unit cost and makes an analogy to private industry:
Unit cost is nothing more than a concept that all of the costs incurred at an
activity should fmd their way into some output measure. The idea is to use a
"business-type" accounting or financial system approach. Private business must
recover all of their costs through the pricing mechanism or they will soon be out
of business. As a result, a body of accounting principles, practices and standards
have been developed as to how to allocate costs to a product. The goal is to have
each product or output bear as accurate a cost as possible, so that as the products
or outputs fluctuate, the revenue and costs will remain in balance. Accounting
practices also recognize that this must be done in a reasonable manner. Thus,
those costs that cannot be easily identified to a product can be based on an
allocation determination that will stand the test of reasonableness.
Professors David Harr and Jim Godfrey came to a similar conclusion in their recent
study comparing private and public sector financial measurement systems. However,
Harr and Godfrey do not indicate that the private sector bases their output prices solely
on the unit cost, rather, it is an aid to cost recovery and the unit cost information is an
important internal tool. (Harr & Godfrey, 1991, p. 9) They state:
Use total cost to determine unit cost measures . Senior managers generally included
all direct and indirect costs in establishing unit cost goals and in evaluating
subsequent fmancial performance for the organization as a whole. This approach
is used primarily to ensure visibility of all costs incurred and to promote the sense
that all organization functions, both operating and support, are ultimately
responsible for the efficient and timely delivery of quality services. Private sector
organizations also found this approach valuable to aid in recovery of costs in
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pricing decisions wherever possible. In a government organization, depreciation
and other indirect costs are included in an innovative use of total unit cost measure
to recover capital funds as well as to evaluate performance.
The unit cost system contrasts with traditional PPBS fixed budget allocation system
in that it becomes an active, ongoing part of the execution phase. Managers of unit cost
activities are as responsible for planning for activity output as with the fixed budget.
However, from a cost standpoint, managers must exercise constant flexibility in response
to changes in demand for their output. In cases where average costs decrease with output
and predicted demand falls short, inflexible managers will find costs exceed earnings.
While in principle the unit cost resourcing concept is easily described, in practice
there are significant complicating factors. For example, if an activity has one identifiable
output then the unit of output is homogenous and easily measured. Few real-world
organizations have only one unique output; most are heterogeneous with multiple types
of output, often measured in different units. Another factor is that costs can be difficult
to measure and vary in nature. This is especially true when costs are spread across the
various types of dissimilar outputs. In some cases, costs must be allocated on a basis not
associated with the output itself. An example of this is allocation of costs of common
services such as fire department, security force or personnel administration costs.
The following three subsections discuss costs and outputs in the unit cost system
context and ties these to the accounting concept of cost-volume-profit (CVP).
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1. COSTS
The unit cost concept captures the three traditionally measured business costs
to determine total costs of operations: direct costs, indirect costs and general and
administrative (G&A). A review of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants definitions of direct, indirect and G&A indicate that the OSD UNIT COST
RESOURCING GUIDANCE defines these costs, for the most part, in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.
Direct costs are those costs directly traceable to an end output and whose
consumption varies directly with output. Accountants refer to costs that vary with output
as "variable costs." Costs that are independent of output are generally referred to as
"fixed costs."
Indirect costs are mission costs associated with more than one but not all outputs.
Indirect costs may or may not vary with output and therefore may be variable, fixed or
a combination of these costs.
General and administrative costs (G&A) are essentially overhead costs. G&A costs
benefit all functions and it is difficult to determine the relationship between a G&A cost
and a particular output. G&A also may be fixed, variable or both.
It is important to note that while the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE
recognizes direct, indirect and G&A costs, as discussed above, the unit cost concept
treats all costs as variable costs. The UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE states
"until such time as fixed and variable costs are distinctly definable and supportable,
earnings will fluctuate with work load as though all costs are variable... "
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2. OUTPUT
Executive Order 12637 states that "appropriate functions" were those with
"measurable outputs." This is an essential element to implement a unit cost resourcing
system. Within the context of the unit cost system, work load and output are
synonymous.
The goal of the unit cost concept is to relate all support activity costs to an output.
Outputs that reflect the major mission for organizations are known as "Primary" outputs.
Outputs not related to the primary mission, but otherwise still required, are called
"Other" outputs. Work load/output measures are discussed further in Chapter IV.
3. THE COST-VOLUME-PROFIT MODEL
Production activities operating under traditional fixed budgets have no
opportunity to gene.-ate profit or loss. Such activities may under or over obligate a fixed
budget, but this is conceptually different than profit or loss which arise as a result of the
difference between total earnings and total costs.
Under the unit costing concept, producers earn a unit cost calculated with the
intent that producers will "breakeven" at the end of the fiscal year. 5 Since the unit cost
system funds production activities in a manner similar to the way private sector firms
5While the notion of "breakeven" in the government seems intuitively correct,
economists believe that the government should provide a service level that maximizes the
value of the resources used. This requires producing output at a point where the
marginal benefit of output is equal to the marginal cost of input, which is not necessarily
a breakeven point.
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generate revenues, profits and losses are not only expected, but inevitable. This idea can
be visually demonstrated using the cost-volume-profit model (CVP) or breakeven analysis
technique commonly employed in the public and private sectors.
Unit cost can be expressed symbolically using the CVP model (adapted from
Harr and Godfrey, 1991, pp. 61-62) as:
TE = TC
where
TE = Total earnings from activity output
TC = Total costs incurred in producing each output
For each output
TE = UC * WL
TC = TDC + TIC + G&A
where
UC = Unit cost
WL = Work load or quantity of output
TDC = Total direct costs
TIC = Total indirect costs
G&A = General and administrative allocated costs
The general form of the unit cost then is
uc
(TDC + TIC + G&A)
WL
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Figure 1 displays the CVP graphically. Note the difference between the
graphic view and the symbolic representation is that total cost is the sum of direct,










fixed or variable costs, or a combination of the two, and total costs are equal to all fixed
plus all variable costs.
The breakeven point, /S, is the point at which neither a profit nor loss occurs.
Points in region X, represent losses and points in region ic, represent profits. Profits and
losses have been a part of military stock and industrial fund activities operating within
revolving funds for over 40 years. The revolving fund concept enables unit cost to be
used as a resourcing system. This concept is included in the discussion of DMRD 971,
found in section C, below.
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B. BENEFITS OF THE UNIT COST CONCEPT
OSD leaders envision unit cost to have benefits in five dimensions. In particular,
unit costs should help to: (1) improve operations, (2) evaluate performance, (3) evaluate
budgets, (4) support budgets and (5) improve decision making. The UNIT COST
RESOURCING GUIDANCE stipulates that the cost reductions are not to come at the
expense of quality. The benefits are briefly summarized:
Improved operations are expected to come about as a result of producers more
carefully managing their operations to minimize costs. 6 Consumers, who will pay higher
prices for fully costed goods will economize, buying only essentials or seeking alternate
sources offering services at a lower price. 7
Personnel performance evaluations will be more meaningful because of standardized
cost methods and comparability among similar organizations of the different services.
Budget evaluation, support and planning will become simpler and more consistent.
Similar performance measures will apply to diverse organizations.
Decision makers in consuming and producing activities will know the full cost of
resources they consume and can make intelligent decisions that integrate cost as an
important consideration. OSD managers can more easily assess impacts of important
6The terms producer and seller are used interchangeably in this thesis. The terms
refer to activities who provide output (e.g., supply activities) in the form of goods or
services.
7The term consumers and customers are used interchangeably in this thesis. The
terms refer to activities (e.g., operational units) who purchase output from producers.
30
decisions and unit cost information will provide additional data on which to base
decisions such as base closures and realignment.
C. FUNCTIONAL AREAS IN THE UNIT COST SYSTEM
The OSD Memorandum of 15 October 1990 which announced unit cost
implementation, also provided the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE . The
UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE stipulated the following areas would be under
unit cost starting in FY 1991:




5. Military Training, and
6. Commissaries.
Previously, Depot Maintenance was included in the unit cost system. However,
it was excluded from the unit cost system because this area already works under a system
for capturing costs against a standard job order.
Base Operation Support (BOS) costs were also originally intended to be under unit
cost resourcing. However, these costs were excluded from the unit cost resourcing
system as a distinct category since they are now computed as part of the overall cost of
output. Thus, all unit cost calculations will include an allocated share of BOS costs.
BOS will be discussed further in Chapters VI and VII.
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In reality, the only functional areas that actually came under the unit cost
resourcing system in FY 1991 were supply operations and depots. The other areas listed
have been the subject of ongoing OSD sponsored task forces and DMDC study, but, for
a variety of reasons, the work had not progressed to the point of actual implementation
in FY 1991.
Since the issuance of the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE in October
1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Defense Management Review Decision
(DMRD) 971 (February 1991). DMRD 971 represents a major step in the continuing
evolution and implementation of unit cost resourcing. It amplifies and confirms the basic
tenants of the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE , while providing a plan and
timetable in which other DoD support functions (business areas) will be included in unit
cost resourcing. The next section discusses DMRD 971.
D. DMRD 971: THE DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND
In accordance with the DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller letter of 15 October
1990, unit cost resourcing was reported as officially implemented in all DoD supply
depots and ICP starting in October 1990. Defense Management Review Decision
(DMRD) Number 971, approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 2 February
1991
,
provides a plan, mechanism and timetable for expanding the implementation of unit
cost resourcing.
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1. DMRD 971 INITIATIVES AND ACTIONS
DMRD 971 expands unit cost resourcing into new business areas and reduces
DoD budget requirements by:
(1) Establishing a revolving fund
8
in FY 1992 called the Defense Business
Operations Fund (DBOF). Revolving fund activities experience profit and loss but adjust
the subsequent year product price (or rate charged to customers) to attain the goal of a
zero Net Operating Result (NOR). The revolving fund thereby provides the mechanism
which will allow support functions to operate under the unit cost resourcing framework;
(2) Providing an estimated timetable to include activities previously operated
on fixed budget basis into the DBOF;
(3) Consolidating other existing revolving funds into the DBOF to improve
cost visibility and financial reporting;
(4) Establishing a new revolving fund in FY 1993, called the Military
Personnel Revolving Fund (MPRF), which provides the mechanism to recover all of the
costs required to support the military member. The fund will include the cost of:
military pay and benefits, medical, training, dependent education, recruiting, family
housing, permanent change of station and subsistence-in-kind, and will operate under the
same business principles as the DBOF;
8A revolving fund is a non-expiring, self renewing appropriation that provides a
financial corpus to finance support activities' operations. Consumers' purchases from
a revolving fund activity reimburse the fund, making more capital available for new
output.
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(5) Instituting Capital Budgeting in both of the new revolving funds to
finance equipment9 for the businesses included in those funds, allowing the businesses
to recover the investment costs overtime;
(6) Reducing the DoD request for Budget Authority as shown in Table 1
.
TABLE 1
Millions of Then Year Dollars
FY 92 FY 93 FY 94
72.0 168.0 404.0




The reductions are a result of estimated saving from implementing the DMRD 971
recommendations. The reductions shown in Table 1 represent an expected one-percent
annual savings as DoD support activities becoming more efficient.
2. DMRD 971 GOALS
The two-fold goal of DMRD 971 is to change DoD financial systems to:
a. Provide better tools and information to employees at every level of the
support establishment;
b. Provide better information to decision makers at every level.
^he Capital Budgeting aspect of unit cost resourcing has not enjoyed
Congressional support. OSD intended the capital budgeting aspect to include all
depreciable assets, such as equipment meeting investment criteria and buildings.
Congress is allowing OSD to include only the equipment portion of capital budgets in
the unit cost resourcing system and has specifically precluded military construction
(MILCON) costs from the system. In an April 1991 GAO report on industrial fund
capital budgeting, the GAO stated that "DoD's capital equipment policies and guidance
still lack adequate controls to correct longstanding problems identified in our previous
reports."
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The long range goal is to have all DoD support activities under the unit cost
resourcing system. However, three criteria must be met in order to move functional
areas into the DBOF or MPRF: (1) have identified outputs; (2) have a cost accounting
system that relates costs to outputs; and, (3) be able to identify customers of the business.
3. DMRD UNDERLYING ISSUES
A summary and discussion of the principles underlying DMRD 971 follow:
Hidden Costs . Historically, many DoD support activities, such as medical,
training, some supply and some weapon platform maintenance (specifically aircraft) and
base operations support costs were budgeted and justified separately from the operating
forces they support. These costs amounted to approximately fifty-percent of the DoD
budget and were not reflected in cost of weapons systems or the forces they support.
Providing fixed budgets to producers instead of consumers makes it impossible for
decision makers to determine the "real" cost of the operational forces.
Improved Accounting and Budgeting . The financial management system
should allocate support costs using business accounting methods. This is necessary so
that DoD costs are reflected in the cost of developing and deploying the operating forces
to the maximum extent possible. The output of DoD is represented by operations of its
military forces. Currently (prior to FY92), these costs are usually allocated to the support
activity that incur the costs.
Additionally, a financial management system should help producers provide
support more efficiently. A system based on cost-per-output for support areas, provides
financial data to top management to measure efficiency and provides important
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managerial information for all levels of management by focusing attention on costs of
outputs.
Operational Control of Operations Support Funding . All appropriations for
equipping and operating the military forces should be provided to the organizations
responsible for the management and direction of those forces. Support services should
be provided on a reimbursable basis rather than by direct appropriation.
Limitation on Revolving Funds Approach . A primary limitation in a financial
management system based on unit cost includes the inability of the support establishment
to adjust "fixed" costs to changes in demand and the noncompetitive nature of many of
the businesses. The use of revolving funds should help to overcome the first limitation.
Revolving funds enable DoD to provide a corpus to cover variations in cost during
execution, while fixing the prices to the costumers.
Advantages of Revolving Funds Approach . Stabilized output prices will
enable program execution as approved by the Administration and Congress. Profits and
losses in the revolving fund will be reflected in the setting of output prices for the
following fiscal year. Congress will continue exercising control over investment items,
by specifically approving such capital purchases. 10
Consolidating all of the costs of a business area will provide management
better visibility of costs. Managers can focus on the unit cost and will have authority to
trade off between elements of cost.
investment, in the DoD financial context, refers to material items costing more than
$15,000 which are not centrally managed.
36
The lack of competitive incentives to reduce costs within a supporting activity
will be overcome by an environment that puts a premium on quality and encourages
managers to reduce costs. In contrast, traditional systems rewarded managers who fully
obligated budgets without regard to the value of output. Under the system described,
customer demands drive production. Customers make trade off decisions based on cost
and need, more effectively using their resources. Top level decision makers will have
better information on weapon system costs. All DoD managers will be encouraged to
reduce costs and the overall support costs for the Department can be significantly
reduced.
4. DMRD UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
The basic principles behind the unit cost system and DMRD 971 can be
summarized as follows:
a. All support activities will be funded on a reimbursable basis, and to the
maximum extent possible, all costs will be recovered, including military personnel costs;
b. Customers will be able to make performance-cost trade offs by knowing
the cost of the alternatives available;
c. Alternatives must be built from the bottom up. Opportunities for
discretionary decisions should be identified at every level;
d. There must be uniform activity pricing principles. Prices must be
established on the basis of cost accounting standards;
e. Producers must meet unit cost goals. Management at every level must
establish goals that each cost center should be expected to meet.
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E. GAO COMMENTS ON DBOF
On April 9, 1991, in testimony to Congress, Mr. Donald Chapin, Assistant
Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office, presented the GAO views on
DBOF. Mr. Chapin stated (GAO, 1991, pp. 1-2):
We support Defense's initiative to adopt a more businesslike approach to the
management and operations of its support functions. This approach would focus
the attention of management at all levels, on the cost of carrying out Defense
operations. At the present time, neither Defense nor the Congress is aware of the
total support costs of operating components, such as Air Force fighter squadrons
or Navy aircraft carriers. In the past, management focused on the elements of cost
rather than on total costs of operations. This initiative could increase the incentives
and tools to manage existing resources with greater efficiency by identifying the
total costs of operations and highlighting the cost implications of decisions made
by managers. In today's environment of decreasing budgets and an increasing
federal deficit, it is vital that Defense spend the funds appropriated by the
Congress in an efficient and effective manner.
Despite support for making Defense more business-like, GAO recommended that DBOF
not be implemented in FY 1992, for a variety of reasons. Prior to implementation, GAO
contends that DoD must:
(1) Develop comprehensive and detailed policies and procedures to govern DBOF
operation;
(2) Develop reliable cost accounting systems to properly capture and report cost
data for each business area;
(3) Ensure that systems in place accurately bill customers the full cost of support
service to fully recover production costs;
(4) Ensure that systems in place accurately account for intrafund transfers;
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(5) Develop performance measures to be used by managers to evaluate the
resources entrusted to them;
(6) Capture DBOF-related capital investment costs;
(7) Prepare a test of the DBOF for a specific area; and,
(8) Prepare auditable financial statements for oversight and control of the DBOF
and customers' appropriations to buy from the DBOF.
Despite the GAO objection to implementing DBOF in FY 1992, OSD leaders
successfully demonstrated that sufficient controls are in place to allow DBOF (and unit
cost) implementation. However, one area where Congress did limit OSD from fully
implementing the unit cost concept was that of Capital Budgeting, discussed on page
43.
F. UNIT COST IN PRACTICE
To arrive at unit cost goals, DMDC accumulates direct and indirect costs associated
with the output for each functional area. DMDC compiles costs from accounting tapes
they receive from regional accounting centers, makes overhead and Base Operations
Support allocations and adds these to the other costs to determine the total cost for each
output in each functional area. OSD provides DMDC with a predicted base level of
output. This is divided into the accumulated total cost to determine the unit cost rate.
Appendix C graphically displays the DMDC unit cost program and the steps necessary
for unit cost calculation.
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The unit cost rate that DMDC calculates is for a functional area within a DoD
component. For example, assume DMDC is calculating the unit cost rate for Navy
supply depots. All costs from all depots are included to determine the total cost of all
Navy depots. The total cost is then divided by the total expected Navy depots output to
arrive at a unit cost rate that represents an average for all Navy supply depots.
The above method provides a top level view of Navy depots, but the calculation
loses significance among comparisons of individual depots. This is why OSD requires
each DoD components receiving unit cost goals at the component level to distribute
(allocate) the unit cost goal among all activities in the component functional area. 11
OSD leaders contend that the components, and not OSD, possesses the detailed
information necessary to properly assess the unit cost goal on an activity basis within a
component functional area. Properly allocating the unit cost goal among the activities
within a functional area will recognize individual differences among activities that could
give rise to substantially different operating costs. For example, the mix of items stored
at depots could significantly affect the cost of operations (e.g., ship anchors versus paper
clips). At the component level, OSD ensures all similar functions have costs
accumulated and unit costs calculated in a consistent manner. OSD can then use the unit
cost data to make inter- and intra- service decisions.
nFor example, DMDC provides the Navy a single unit cost goal for Navy supply
depots. The Navy has the responsibility (assigned to the Commander, Naval Supply
Systems Command) of determining how the Navy supply depot unit cost goal should be
distributed (split) among the depots.
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Allocating the unit cost goal is also necessary in order for DMDC to track activity
specific earnings. DMDC reports the costs and earnings information by activity and
functional area by component in monthly reports generically known as "unit cost
reports." For depots, the reports are officially titled "Depots Cost, Manpower and
Workload Analysis Report."
The unit cost rate is fixed at the beginning of the year, based on prior year costs
and the estimated level of business for the current year. Over the fiscal year, OSD may
direct DMDC to revise the unit cost based on continuing analysis and changing
conditions. The earnings value which each activity receives is based on actual units of
output multiplied by the DMDC-calculated unit cost. In the simplified discussion of the
unit cost concept (section A), the earnings value would also be equal to the amounts
customers pay for the output. In practice, this is not always the case as the method of
determining the amount consumers pay and the amount support activities receive differs
by functional area. Even with differences between price and unit costs (such as at supply
depots), OSD officials have as a goal zero a Net Operating Result (NOR). Reflecting
this objective, prices and unit cost goals are adjusted at least annually to incorporate the
prior year profit or loss.
At the beginning of the fiscal year, each activity receives an obligational target
which is based on the expected unit cost times the predicted work load. This number
establishes the initial obligational authority against which an activity charges its costs of
operations. At the end of the fiscal year, the actual work load is multiplied times the
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final unit cost to determine the total earnings for the activity. 12 The total earnings
establishes maximum obligational authority for each activity. By law, a government
activity is not allowed to exceed the approved budget. Operating under the DBOF
revolving fund provides unit cost activities an umbrella for which the Title 31, U.S.
Code (1517) responsibility rests with OSD.
The initial DMDC-calculated unit cost is based on historical cost data rather than
future plan or expected data. This approach forces activity managers to carefully
consider each cost object and to ensure each cost object contributes to the efficiency of
the function. 13 Unnecessary costs drive production costs to levels which insure that the
producer will not receive sufficient earnings to cover costs if actual sales fall short of the
predicted demand. A major goal of unit cost resourcing is to encourage managers to
continuously improve productivity and reduce cost.
While producers must carefully watch costs, so too must consumers. As the unit
cost system is implemented, support activities migrate from fixed budgets to unit cost
resourcing. Budget based transfers will take funding away from support activities
(producers/sellers) and provide these funds to operational activities
(consumers/customers). Consumers will pay for each unit of output which theoretically
covers all resources consumed in producing that output. The unit cost concept is based
12The unit cost is subject to change. Customers pay at the rate established at the
beginning of the year. Producers receive earnings based on a potentially variable unit
cost.
13A cost object is any activity for which a separate measurement of cost is desired.
(Horngrin, 1987, p. 21)
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on the premise that if decision makers (consumers in this case) bear the full cost of their
decisions, then they will economize and make better financial decisions when using their
own resource funds.
One Congressionally imposed limitation on the OSD vision of total cost recovery
within the unit cost concept is in the area of Capital Budgeting. OSD leaders planned
that unit cost would fully recover the cost of all depreciable capital investment assets,
such as equipment and buildings. Congress is allowing OSD to include only the
equipment portion of capital budgets in the unit cost resourcing system and has
specifically precluded military construction (MILCON) costs from the system.
In an April 1991 GAO report on industrial fund capital budgeting, the GAO stated
that "DoD's capital equipment policies and guidance still lack adequate controls to
correct longstanding problems identified in our previous reports." Despite corrections
DoD may make in GAO-identified "longstanding problems," it is unlikely OSD will get
Congressional consent to allow DoD managers to unilaterally make construction decisions
and to eliminate the MILCON appropriations. This is so for two reasons: (1) making
the MILCON appropriation part of the DBOF could obscure MILCON visibility and
reduce Congressional oversight; some believe this would enable DoD to build without
Congressional project authorization; and, (2) traditionally, MILCON projects (like base
closures) have been especially political; construction projects are among the tangible
ways Members of Congress can demonstrate their efforts on behalf of their constituents.
For these reasons, Congress is not likely to let slip from their direct control MILCON
oversight.
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The unit cost resourcing system has intuitive appeal because DoD resource users
are generally unaware of the full cost of resources consumed in producing primary
outputs. Unit cost strives to provide a full accounting of all costs; under the traditional
budget based system personnel, facilities and equipment are provided "free" (no cost) to
activities.
In pre-unit cost production, the cost of activities with fixed budgets were not
allocated to output, thereby heavily subsidizing consumer prices for output. Two
examples of such subsidies include: (1) the cost of operating supply ICPs and depots
were excluded from the cost of material consumed; and, (2) the cost of military
personnel salaries and fringe benefits was not included and often overlooked in decision
making. With artificially low prices, consumers regarded output as free or inexpensive.
This led to suboptimal allocation (waste and abuse) of DoD produced output in both
consumer and producer organizations. This concept will be explored more fully in
Chapter V.
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IV. UNIT COST: IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY
This chapter discusses the unit cost concept in the context of a new DoD strategy
and provides views of unit cost and implementation issues from several perspectives.
Information regarding unit cost implementation was collected from personal
interviews, telephone conversations and document reviews conducted at field offices and
organizational headquarters. 14 The issues raised by field level managers reflect the
personal and professional views of those interviewed, and do not necessarily indicate
systemic problems. Interviews with senior Navy and OSD personnel were intended to
ascertain the official views of those organizations, but personal views were also
expressed in some cases. To the extent possible, the issues raised were discussed with
the DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller or members of his staff.
A. THE UNIT COST CONCEPT: A SYSTEM AND STRATEGY
The unit cost concept represents more than a change to accounting procedures, new
computer programs or other general managerial changes. It is a new strategy which
OSD leaders believe is the correct response to integrate DoD management into the
current and future environment facing DoD. When fully implemented the unit cost
concept will provide a financial system for planning, operating, controlling and
measuring the performance of DoD support activities. The unit cost concept clearly
14The author has made every attempt to fairly describe the interview results and is
solely responsible for the accuracy of portraying comments made in the interviews.
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displays nine of the ten characteristics R. Evered uses to describe strategic vice
operational decisions. Evered says strategic decisions are: (1) comprehensive; (2) for,
by or on behalf of top level management; (3) future-defining; (4) re-configuring the
organization environment relationship; (5) important; (6) non-routine; (7) value- setting;
(8) new ventures and activities; (9) focused on environmental fluidity; and, (10) complex.
(Evered, 1990, p D The unit cost concept, if viewed as a strategy, seems to fit these
characteristics.
The nunc to implementing unit cost resourcing can be compared to business
strategy changes. In most cases, businesses change strategies in response to perceived
environmental changes. In some cases, business strategy is designed with a fundamental
homeostatic nature. As the environment changes, small changes occur in the firm so that
the firm maintains balance with the environment. In adopting unit cost resourcing which
the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE states will maintain balance between costs
and earnings. OSD leaders appear to be seeking a long term strategy that moves DoD
business activities closer to the homeostatic mode.
The unit cost initiative embodies the largest change in DoD management since the
introduction of PPBS. and arguably has more impact. The unit cost concept affects
virtually 100 percent of the DoD budget and organizations, and will likely have a
profound effect on DoD management. However, permanent, beneficial change will only
arise as a result of changes in the culture and values of DoD managers. OSD leaders
recognize the issue of "culture" by saying, "If we are to minimize the impact of
constrained resource levels, we must chance the environment and culture that exits at
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many of our activities." (DoD Comptroller memorandum of 10 August 1989) To
maximize the benefit of the new strategy, OSD leaders must concern themselves not only
with what the changes will be, but how they will be made.
Robert B. Reich of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
suggests public servants accomplish change or implement policy using variations of three
methods: (1) effectiveness, where the public official implements something in a
manipulative manner because he thinks it is for the public good; (2) responsiveness,
where the public official plays a passive role in doing whatever he is asked to do; and,
(3) deliberativeness , where the public official establishes a broad base of relationships,
understands that actions may have broad ramifications and seeks consensus oriented
policies and actions, but also incorporates his own ideals into such policies or actions.
(Reich, 1985, pp. 1-6) Expanding the Reich notion to management culture seems to
indicate that the deliberative method would seem to best foster cultural changes. In the
consensus oriented model, participants have a stake in the future, as opposed to the
effectiveness method where participants carry out the plan of another person.
In implementing the unit cost concept, OSD formed various task forces composed
of representatives from appropriate DoD components. However, these task forces were
not formed to determine whether or not to adopt unit cost, but rather to establish
implementation frameworks and definitions (e.g., what constitutes output within the
different functional areas). It seems then, applying the Reich categories to the unit cost
effort, that the OSD unit cost development and implementation could be classified as
"effective." This approach should lead to development of the unit cost concept system,
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but a "deliberative" approach would have enabled system development with an attendant
change in culture.
The fully implemented unit cost concept integrates management skill with
information technology, and provides a different (new) set of management incentives. 15
However, the unit cost system currently being implemented provides a high level of data
aggregation. OSD leaders must carefully check that the system encourages the desired
results. On this point, G. Anthony Gorry and Michael S. Morton write that "...systems
which were developed for senior management had relatively little impact on the way in
which managers made decisions. This...problem is a direct result of failure to
understand the basic information needs of the different activities." (Gorry & Morton,
1971, pp. 55-56) OSD leaders want to change the way managers think by changing the
systems managers use. The concept will only succeed if the system provides users with
appropriate information to facilitate an evolution of the culture and values, and
encourages goal congruence with that of the OSD leaders.
The remainder of this chapter examines Navy implementation of the unit cost
system as a strategy, but focuses on the barriers to implementation, starting with a top
level view. A more detailed discussion is framed within the context of Figure 3, "The
Unit Cost Concept." This discussion analyzes implementation issues at lower levels and
15The concept of the manager-information technology merger is presented in the DoD
FINANCIAL OPERATIONS BUSINESS PLAN , of 8 August 1991. The Plan, is part
of the OSD initiative on Corporate Information Management (CEM) and was produced
by the CEM Financial Operations group. The Plan, provides a strategy for development
and implementation of new financial operating systems.
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reflects comments collected from field research. The chapter concludes by examining
implementation of the unit cost system in several functional areas.
B. RESOURCE OR MICROMANGEMENT: THE TOP VIEW
In an interview with the Honorable Robert J. McCormack, the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Financial Management) (ASN(FM)), Mr. McCormack stated that he
supported the unit cost concept. He felt the basic focus of unit cost, relating costs with
outputs and increased cost awareness at all levels of management, is an important step
in better allocating and using scarce DoD resources; he has publicly endorsed the unit
cost initiative.
16 However, Mr. McCormack noted that the unit cost concept does not
enjoy full support from all members of the Office of the Navy Comptroller
(NAVCOMPT OP-82). Mr. McCormack explained the primary reason unit cost seems
to meet resistance lies in the level and detaiJ of data necessary to produce the unit cost
information. Under the unit cost reporting system, lower levels of detailed accounting
information become visible and important. With fixed budgets, detailed information
tends to remain buried in the paper files of field level comptroller shops.
Mr. McCormack feels the primary objection to making data more visible is the
increased exposure in the budgeting process as well as some loss of Navy control over
the process. As the budget makes its way through the various reviews, additional details
provided in unit cost data will give organizations outside the Navy (e.g., OSD, OMB and
Congress) an opportunity to micromanage Navy affairs. He discussed his disagreement
16Speech at the Naval Postgraduate School in April 1991
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with these concerns, expressing a more global perspective of resource allocation and an
appreciation for the focus on the cost of output.
The notion that the Navy would lose control was confirmed and emphasized by a
high ranking NAVCOMPT official. The official stated that the Navy is concerned that
once the DBOF is established, OSD will arbitrarily move funds among the services
without Navy consent. 17
Another aspect regarding Navy support of the unit cost effort is that the Navy has
provided little guidance to its headquarters or field level commands. The only formal
memoranda addressing unit cost resourcing at the headquarters level was a ASN(FM)
letter of 25 July 1991 which formally forwarded the detailed UNIT COST
RESOURCING GUIDANCE provided as part of the 15 October 1990 Principal Deputy
Comptroller letter. (McCormack, 1991, p.l) The first paragraph of the ASN(FM) letter
states, "This program is currently in the execution phase for Supply Operations and
Supply Depots." Yet the second paragraph states:
[the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE! was previously provided
informally to all Navy and Marine Corps members of the Unit Cost working groups
and forms the basis for Supply Unit Cost Goals currently in existence. Since
OSD(C) 18 advises that they intend to issue targets for the near future, enclosure
(1) is provided for your information and action as necessary. 19 (italics added)
17This allegation is probably correct. However, OSD routinely made intraservice
stock and industrial fund transfers prior to establishing the DBOF.
18Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) office.
'"Enclosure (1) to this letter was the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE .
50
It is unclear what (if any) formal Navy direction the supply activities were following
between October 1990 and July 1991, even though unit cost had been implemented in the
supply area.
Discussions with several personnel in the NAVCOMPT office confirmed the beliefs
of the ASN(FM) regarding the NAVCOMPT staff support of the unit cost concept.
Some members of the NAVCOMPT staff believe that if the unit cost effort were not
supported, it would "go away." Additional evidence that top level Navy financial leaders
were not avid unit cost concept advocates was that unit cost received virtually no priority
or resources within the NAVCOMPT office. As of August 1991, few personnel within
the NAVCOMPT office were assigned responsibilities associated with implementing the
unit cost concept in Navy functions.
For example, DMDC started programming the Navy portion of Base Operations
Support allocation in the summer of 1991. To accomplish this, DMDC needed data on
the structure of the Navy installations in order to determine host-tenant relationships.20
DMDC received information on the many Navy installations and commands in "hard
copy" or paper format. The Navy alleged it could not provide a timely response to the
DMDC request for the information in a machine readable format. A review of the hard
copy information confirmed it was nearly impossible to interpret and seemingly
contradicted itself. DMDC was unable to obtain sufficient assistance from NAVCOMPT
and had to turn to alternate means to accomplish their task.
20A host is the command at a military installation responsible for providing landlord
type services. A tenant is the receives landlord services.
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The DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller formed a policy group of high level
component officials. The group routinely meets with the Principal Deputy Comptroller.
The purpose of the meetings is to facilitate communication between the components and
OSD in implementing the unit cost concept. Group members raise component issues or
problems which the DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller either resolves or communicates
to the appropriate activity for review and resolution. The designated Navy representative
is the Deputy Comptroller of the Navy.
On 9 August 1991, the DoD Principal Deputy Secretary issued a letter providing
guidance to assist activities "which will be resourced through Unit Cost, in developing
their FY 1992 Apportionment Review requirements." Shortly thereafter on 17 August
1991, the DoD Comptroller (Mr. Sean O'Keefe) issued a letter providing supplementary
FY 1993 Defense Budget Guidance for the DBOF. Both of these documents required
extensive budget displays in unit cost format for the execution of FY 1992 programs and
the review of FY 1993 Budget Requests. These actions reinforce the objective that OSD
intends to pursue unit cost as a resource allocation method, despite service and agency
apprehension of the unit cost concept.
C. GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
From the viewpoint of good management, it would be reasonable to expect DoD
activity managers to embrace a system that promised to reduce cost, improve quality,
provide a more equitable basis for personnel evaluations and provide better performance
information for management decisions. However, the size and complexity of the DoD
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establishment, the magnitude of the unit cost concept and the general resistance to change
have created numerous obstacles. The rapid pace to implement the unit cost concept has
been met with skepticism and OSD is concerns that defense organizations will not attempt
to remove barriers to full implementation.
For clarity, the implementation discussion refers to the Unit Cost Concept figure
previously discussed and repeated here as Figure 4. The figure is provided as
framework for discussion of the implementation issues.
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Figure 4
1. UNIFORM ACCOUNTING AND DATA RELIABILITY
In calculating the unit cost, DMDC requires an automated method of
capturing total costs. (Refer to "Support Activity Costs" in Figure 4.) A key decision
of unit cost implementation was to use existing financial information to minimize the time
necessary to implement unit cost instead of developing a new, uniform DoD accounting
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system. To meet this criteria, the Uniform Management Report (UMR) was chosen by
OSD as the source for unit cost data. This source was chosen because DoD activities are
required to report financial information via the UMR, making it a common system
among DoD activities.
Only two of the seven field comptroller activities visited suggested theirUMR
data was accurate. Most stated they knew their UMR data was not accurate since there
is generally little concern with UMR data. The majority of the field comptrollers
interviewed indicated that making UMR data accurate is unnecessary since they do not
use the UMR as a management tool and it would require resources they needed to
employ elsewhere. Based on this reaction from the field comptrollers, it would appear
that UMR data is not uniform and the reliability is questionable. Further, there has been
no known OSD effort to validate the data. Therefore, if the cost accounting data
underlying the unit cost goals is suspect, the unit cost goals may not accurately represent
costs of business.
The OSD response is that DoD component accounting system data must include
specified information. The data arrangement may differ from one system to another, but
all the data needed for the unit cost concept is currently available. The unit cost system
takes the available data and manipulates it to provide a unit cost. OSD considers the
currently available data sufficient and accurate for unit cost computations.
None the less, the opening words of the UNIT COST RESOURCING
GUIDANCE , say:
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It is recognized that there is an absence of a uniform accounting system
throughout the Department to capture unit cost data and this guidance is
intended to establish a practical level of consistency and uniformity until such
time as there is a standard system in place.
OSD is committed to developing and introducing a standardized DoD-wide accounting
system consistent with the newly consolidated Defense Finance and Accounting Service
(DFAS) and within the context of the Corporate Information Management initiative.
However, development and introduction of such a system is not expected for several
years. 21
2. UNIT COST MEANS MORE WORK FOR COMPTROLLERS
During the interview phase of this thesis, field level comptrollers expressed
concern that the unit cost concept represents additional work load which will require
additional staff. There are two issues driving this concern: (1) unit cost resourcing relies
heavily on reimbursable orders and comptrollers perceive this will substantially increase
the accounting and record keeping workload; (2) the DMDC unit cost report provides
activity unit cost goals, earnings and cost accumulation at the component level. The
DMDC unit cost reports should provide the activity commanders with useful information.
However, comptrollers will have to locally develop and monitor a detailed unit cost
reporting system in order to provide meaningful information to the lowest level of
management within the activity.
21The DoD Principal Deputy Comptroller indicated that he felt DOD would have a
new standard accounting system within five years.
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In addressing the first issue, OSD contends that this additive accounting work
load can be overcome by placing large orders and encouraging frequent reports, but only
requiring quarterly or infrequent billings. This planned action will reduce financial
transactions and the reimbursement will be accomplished at the headquarters level,
eliminating paper checks. The OSD(C) has indicated that in subsequent years technology
may make manual intervention unnecessary. This assumption is based on the expectation
that when the new standardized accounting systems are fully operational, field activities
may not have to reconcile financial transactions.
Regarding the second issue, OSD personnel agreed that field comptrollers will
have to devise local systems to provide appropriate unit cost information to the lowest
level of management. However, OSD guidance indicates that this should not be solely
a comptroller function. Line managers need to proactively participate in the development
of a command unit cost information system to ensure all levels get the functional type
and quality of information needed to promote greater effectiveness and management
efficiency.
3. UNIT COST CALCULATION AND EARNINGS
The unit cost calculation method treats all costs as variable, determining an
average cost for the functional area. However, field comptrollers interviewed indicate
they have fixed costs in the primary mission cost structure. Assuming component
services and agencies accurately distribute unit cost goals among the activities of a
functional area, the fixed cost portion of the activity cost structure precludes costs and
earnings from staying in balance, as indicated in the UNIT COST RESOURCING
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GUIDANCE . Activities operating under unit cost cannot influence demand (i.e.,
producers have no mechanism to legitimately increase requests for their output) and the
activities may be able to exercise only limited control over significant costs such as
labor. In addition, the unit cost rate is subject to significant variation based on the
predicted demand level selected by OSD.
A DLA activity comptroller noted that when work load is increasing, unit
cost can provide a favorable outcome for the support activity. An activity receiving
operating funds under the unit cost system automatically receives more resources as
demand for output increases. In the short run, fixed costs are not likely to increase. The
fixed cost portion of the unit cost is recovered when the predicted demand is reached.
As long as average variable costs do not increase with output, every sale made beyond
the predicted output provides a substantial contribution to net earnings since the fixed
costs have been covered." The opposite result is achieved when the actual output is
less than the predicted demand. In this case, unless managers have been able to reduce
costs, a loss will result. This is largely a result of earnings not covering fixed costs.
In the current environment, with downsizing of the force structure, it is realistic to
predict a shrinking demand base until the force structure stabilizes. How this will impact
the amount of unit cost earnings activities receive is unclear at this time since there are
significant force structure decisions pending.
22Net earnings is defined as Earning (Unit Cost times Output) less Total Costs.
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4. UNIT COSTS ARE NOT COMMERCIAL PRICES
The objective ol Ihc unit cost concept is to "recover" all costs hy relating
them tO an output. Tins approach is justified by the OSD(C) guidance which states that
business must recover its costs through proper pricing. While it is true that commercial
activities musl recover costs through prices, the issue of commercial pricing is far more
complex than the DoD unit cost approach of dividing accumulated costs by a work load
base (Rcfei to "Develop Unit Cost" in Figure 4.)
The comparison of DoD unit tost pricing to commercial prices implies that
commercial activities would not accept offers for output if the otter did nol cover the
luiiv burdened cosi of production, En fact, this is nol true. Commercial activities
frequently use a contribution margin approach to managerial accounting. They are
concerned with how much revenue a sale contributes over variable costs. This
Contribution helps COVei fixed costs .lobs orders are not rejected purely on the basis that
the allocated fixed cost is nol Completely Covered, Issues such as capacity utilization,
market conditions, etc., influences price and job order acceptance.
5. OUTPUT DEFINITION, EARNINGS AM) INCENTIVES
Another major concern was the issue o\ output definition. Most activities
have many outputs As currently implemented, the unit cost concept expresses all of the
output foi an activity in .i single oi few output numbers. Appendix B pan ides the output
measures b\ functional area. (Refer to 'Support Activity Output" in Figure 4.)
"Contribution margin is "Equal to revenue (sales) minus all variable expenses."
(Homgrin, 1987, p. 952)
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Field comptrollers contend unit cost output considerations do not adequately
describe the work of an activity in a manner useful to managers at all levels. Further,
many costs which may be captured to get total cost could have cost drivers unrelated to
the primary output. For example, an ICP earns a percent of every dollar of stock funded
material sold. This occurs regardless of whether the ICP sells one million one dollar
parts or one, one million dollar part. It is possible that the activity incurs much higher
costs in the former case than in the later. Under the unit cost concept, both cases earn
the same amount of operating resource.
An interesting factual example of output cost versus unit cost earnings was
found at the Defense Depot Region, West (DDRW). During the Desert Storm/Shield
operation, DDRW received a single requisition for pre-packaged food rations known as
MREs (Meals, Ready to Eat). The output, "issue per line," earns DDRW about $28.50
per line item issued. DDRW rilled a single requisition for a quantity of MREs that
equated to twenty-eight train box cars of the MREs, for which DDRW received the unit
cost earning of $28.50. While this is a rare occurrence, it serves to illustrate the point
that work load costs are unrelated to earnings.
During a recent interview, Mr. Shycoff acknowledged such problems. He
stated that as unit cost is implemented and experience is gained, he hoped the users in
the functional areas will determine additional measurable outputs that will provide better
managerial information. Mr. Shycoff indicated his willingness to ensure the unit cost
system is flexible. As an example, Mr. Shycoff said that for supply depots, he foresees
that the unit cost system of the future will relate a unit cost down to the National Stock
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Number (NSN) level. This change would account for the variations of cost incurred in
handling and storing the diverse materials DoD requires. Examples include specialized
handling techniques such those needed for hazardous material or for variations in size
and weight (e.g., paper clips versus ship anchors). At the depots, the system currently
measures line items issued and received without regard to type of material.
6. OUTPUT: INCENTIVES AND QUALITY
Another issue related to output definition is that of management incentives
and quality. Unit cost earnings only accrue for output actually purchased. This feature
is designed as a management incentive to provide output more efficiently, only at the
level demanded. However, an unintentional but unavoidable result of the unit cost
concept is that managers who need earnings to cover costs now have an incentive to
"game" output measures to produce higher earnings. Two examples illustrate this point:
a. In the interview with Mr. Shycoff, he indicated that originally DLA had
been assigned four unit cost numbers: issues and receipts for each binable (small items)
and bulk (large items). Bulk items received a unit cost about twice that of the bin items,
and the unit cost earnings was determined by the storage location items were assigned
to or retrieved from. Each location was designated as either bin or bulk. One activity
realized that by reporting more of their receipts and issues from the bulk locations they
would receive more earnings. When Mr. Shycoff learned this, he directed that the unit
cost numbers be revised to reflect only issues and receipts, regardless of the item.
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b. A training command receives earnings based on the output of number of
graduates. It is possible that a command in need of resources could lower its standards,
produce more graduates and generate more earnings.
Although the UNIT COST RESOURCE GUIDANCE stipulates that lower
cost is not to come at the expense of quality, in many cases quality is difficult to
measure. For example, what is the quality difference between a training graduate who
passes the course by a point and a person who fails by the same margin. Unit cost could
provide incentives that tend to lower quality of output in ways that would be difficult to
detect in the short run, but that could have adverse long run ramifications. 24 For
example, if ICPs lower spare stock quantities to reduce costs, the lower inventory levels
could impair or reduce operational force readiness and capability by increasing equipment
downtime for lack of parts.
One way to mitigate the potential impact of quality reduction and encourage
managers to find other ways to cut costs is by giving consumers choices. If consumers
perceive "quality" is declining, given choice they might choose to purchase output from
a different producer. Knowing his demand base could erode because of poor output
quality would encourage producers to maintain a focus on the cost and "quality" factors
of their output.
^Quality is defined in many ways. These include the physical "quality" of products
sold to the "quality" of services which might be based on through-put or waiting time.
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7. PROFITS, LOSSES, GAIN SHARING AND TQL/M
Unit cost activities are targeted to operate at a net operating result (NOR) of
zero, i.e. , the breakeven point. But, because, the unit cost method of resource allocation
ties operating resources to output, "profits" or "losses" will likely result. (Refer to
"Customers Pay Bills" and "Payments Reimburse Fund" in Figure 4.) Those activities
with losses will have the loss built into the unit cost rate for the next year in order to
reimburse the revolving fund for the "capital advance" required to cover losses. Those
activities with profits may have unit cost goal lowered for the next year reflecting their
better than expected productivity. However, because the unit cost rate is a composite for
the functional area within a component, whether or not improved productivity will
actually reduce rates is a function of how well the component has distributed the unit cost
goal. A paradox seems to emerge. If managers improve the production process at one
activity, the reward is a lower per unit earnings for the following year. Another activity
in the same business that has not similarly lowered costs is rewarded for failure to lower
costs by receiving higher per unit earnings. This situation would seem to provide a
disincentive to the first activity to continue lowering costs.
To counter this apparent problem, as with the issue of quality previously
discussed, if consumers had choice, then the producer that lowered his cost the most
could expect increased demand as a result of a lower price (assuming demand is price
sensitive). Allowing consumers choice could offset the disincentives the unit cost
structure may introduce.
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Activities with profits may share profits under the authority of DoD
instruction 5010.31-G, the DoD guide for gain sharing programs. During the interview
with Mr. Shycoff, he stated that the profit sharing potential was the unit cost concept
connection with the total quality leadership/management (TQL/M) concept, the current
focus for DoD quality management improvement. This is so because as employees and
management work together to improve process management and reduce costs, the profit
sharing potential acts as an incentive reward. The TQL/M purist takes issue with this
approach because in the TQL/M philosophy, the "reward" is more intrinsic, stemming
from each employee being a participant in management and its evolution. "Providing"
a new management system and forming task forces to implement it is not an application
of TQL/M. In regard to the actual payout, field research found that profit sharing at
supply depots operating under unit cost or similar systems only provided substantial
payouts for the first year (over $500 per employee). By the third year, payouts had all
stopped or were relatively insignificant (less than $100 per employee).
8. CONSTRAINTS, CHOICE AND INTERDEPENDENCE
OSD contends that activities cannot efficiently implement unit costing when
headquarters burdens field activities with constraints. Among the most severe of these
is labor constraints. For example, NAVSUP operates under two seemingly mutually
exclusive systems that ostensibly control costs by controlling the ability of a field activity
to hire labor. These systems are called manage-to-payroll (MTP) and end strength
ceilings. Under MTP, an activity is issued a labor budget, which in theory may be used
to hire any combination of workers (different pay levels). In reality, such hiring is
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limited by the senior (headquarters) management imposing labor limits in the form of
end-strength (numbers of people) ceilings. Mr. Shycoff claims activities cannot
efficiently implement unit cost with such limits on local managers.
There are other constraints that also impede the ability of an organization to
pursue improved productivity. Examples include mandatory periodic OMB Circular A-
76 reviews, legislative or agency imposed procurement regulations, and restrictions on
the ability of managers to choose the most cost effective means of obtaining support.
OSD leaders seek to relieve as many of these internal and external constrains as
reasonably feasible to provide managers greater flexibility in pursuing improved
efficiency and effectiveness.
This is not to say activity mangers should be allowed unlimited choice.
Common sense must be exercised to ensure managers do not choose options that benefit
one organization at the expense of overall efficiency or cost effectiveness. An example,
makes this point clear: A commanding officer of a commissary found that fire protection
service could be obtained less expensively than the cost of the on-base fire station
allocated to the commissary. The commanding officer was allowed to purchase the
alternate fire protection. What is not clear is whether the fire station was able to reduce
costs by an amount equal to the charge (allocation) to the commissary. It is highly
unlikely this occurred. Decisions that benefit one activity should not be made without
considering the systemic ramifications and organizational interdependences.
64
D. UNIT COST IMPLEMENTATION IN NAVY FUNCTIONS
For most Navy managers, the concept of resource management by a unit cost
system is new. Most of the field comptroller personnel interviewed had heard of the unit
cost concept. However, only about one-half of those interviewed had read the UNIT
COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE or any memoranda on unit costing. At the field
level, there is a general confusion about the concept and its goals, and no formal Navy
training available to correct this situation. Thus, there is apprehension about the potential
usefulness of the unit cost system. So far, the main contact most field activities have had
with unit cost has been with data collection evolutions conducted during late November
1990. (NAVCOMPT, 220454Z Nov 90)
Although the Navy has not formally incorporated unit cost information into a
training program, one Navy activity recently acquired an Army-produced training video
tape. The tape was being introduced into the training program of the activity. The tape,
entitled "Cost Per Output," features an interview with Mrs. Mary H. Smith, Deputy
Directory, Program Analysis and Evaluation for Program Management Systems for the
U.S. Army. The tape was produced by the U.S. Army Logistics Management College
and is an excellent primer for understanding the unit cost concept at any level.
1. SUPPLY DEPOTS AND INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS
The Navy supply system, overseen by the Commander, Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) is responsible for worldwide logistics and supply operations
supporting the U.S. Navy. This is accomplished mainly through supply operations and
depots. Supply operations (inventory control points, or ICPs) provide fleet support,
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including inventory management, spare part allowance list maintenance and direct fleet
support. Supply depots (called Naval Supply Centers, or NSCs) provide physical
distribution service, including receipt, storage and issue functions. They also provide
direct fleet support functions, such as technical research and spot procurement for high
priority requirements. Tables 2 and 3 display business information for Navy ICPs and
depots respectively, for FYs 90 and 91, and is provided to indicate the magnitude of
ICPs and depot operations and provide unit cost information. The data Tables 2 and 3
is taken from DMDC-produced unit cost reports.
Since 1986, NAVSUP has been operating two ICPs and eight major depots
on a resource allocation system called Productive Unit Resourcing (PUR). In essence,
PUR is a type of unit costing. As such, NAVSUP has chosen to retain the name PUR
rather than adopt the name unit cost. There are several important differences between
the unit cost rate and the PUR rate. These include: the costs included in the calculations
of the rates, the method of accepting the rates and the outputs to which the rates apply.
The unit cost goal is fully burdened with the costs of operations and material
obligations. 25 PUR captured only variable or "controllable" operating costs. Under
PUR, material obligations and other costs were budgeted separately. Another difference
between unit cost and PUR concerns the process for setting goals. Under the unit cost
system, OSD will provide DMDC-calculated unit cost goals and these are subject to
change over the fiscal year. With PUR, the activity comptrollers individually calculate
25Material obligations are the actual costs of material paid to material suppliers.
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their PUR rates and travel to NAVSUP headquarters to negotiate the final rate. The last
major difference is that PUR recognizes many outputs while unit cost provides one goal





FY 1990 FY 1991
Inventory Control Points (Total) :
Primary Output Costs '
Civilian Labor $ 109.9 $ 157.7
Military Labor 5.8 10.9
Depot Reimbursement 97.5 227.1
Material 3,031.4 3,007.5
Other Non-Labor 4.8 269.4
Allocated Costs 93.3 109.7
Total Costs 2 $ 3,342.7 $ 3.783.2
Work load (Dollars of Stock Fund Sales) $ 4.181.9 $ 4,656.6
Unit Cost $ .80 $ .80
Total Other Output Costs $ 26.8 $ 19.7
Total ICP Output Costs $ 3.369.5 $ 3.802.9
'Early unit cost reports classified some cost differently
than more recent reports, making some comparisons difficult
between years.





FY 1991Navy Supply Centers (Total):






Work load (In Total Lines Received)
Unit Cost






Work load (In Total Lines Issued)
Unit Cost
Primary Output Costs: Other Costs






Total Primary Output Costs
Total Other Output Costs
Total Navy Supply Center Output Costs
'"Totals" differences due to rounding.
2Contract carriers.
includes Civilian and Military Labor, and Allocated Costs.
4
"Other Costs included in "Primary Non-Labor" could not be broken out.
Data Source for Tables 2 & 3:
FY 1990 Depot Cost and Manpower Analysis Report of 1/12/91
FY 1991 Cost Per Output Reporting System Total Navy Supply of 11/5/91




$ 55.6 $ 58.7
2,756,386 2,224,441
$ 20.17 $ 26.41








$ 52.55 $ 16.42
$ NOTE4 $ 173.6
29.4 31.6
NOTE4 35.7
$ 29.4 $ 240.9
$492.7 $412.3
$ 159.1 $ 387.9
$695.1 $ 800.2
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During interviews it was clear that NAVSUP headquarters personnel were well informed
and generally supported the unit cost concept. The NAVSUP comptroller stated he saw
PUR as a subset of unit cost and that PUR would eventually transition into the larger unit
cost concept. However, as previously discussed, there were reservations expressed about
the reliability of the unit cost goals since they are based on data from the UMR and
include material cost as part of the unit cost.
It is interesting to note that even though the Principal Deputy Comptroller
letter of October 15, 1990 announced that unit cost was working at supply depots, the
pre-unit cost version of PUR was actually in place at Navy depots and operating with the
Navy stock fund in FY 1991. In order to meet the timetable, DMDC was producing the
monthly unit cost reports so that earnings and costs could be tracked as if unit cost
resourcing were actually working. An OSD analyst explained this apparent paradox by
saying OSD can claim unit cost is working because with DMDC producing reports and
collecting data, "it is working." OSD has allowed activities to slowly achieve operating
status in recognition of the complexity in shifting to unit cost resourcing. However, the
analyst indicated that OSD personnel would be working with the components to
encourage a more rapid implementation of the unit cost concept into designated functions.
a. Current Status
With a history of operating under PUR, NAVSUP activities should
generally experience a smooth transition to unit cost resourcing. However, as of August
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1991, NAVSUP had provided little specific direction to field activities with regard to
unit cost or review of unit cost reports. Further, NAVSUP has advised field activities
that the transition to unit cost will be transparent. The DMDC-produced unit cost reports
were provided to NAVSUP field activities at the insistence of OSD personnel. This
information was confirmed by the headquarters and field activity interviews.
Unit cost resources are provided to depots for receipts and issues and to
ICPs as a percentage of material sales. Additionally, ICPs must pay depots $25.00 for
each line of material issued or received, since OSD has taken the view that the depots
"do the ICPs" work. OSD established this relationship on the basis that the ICPs are
responsible for the how much, where, what and when in inventory management while
the depots are responsible for the actual inventory handling. NAVSUP assigned a split
of 48 and 52 percent respectively between the two ICPs, Navy Ships Parts Control
Center in Mechanicsburg. PA (SPCC) and the Aviation Support Office in Philadelphia
for line items of material handled at the depots. OSD has requested NAVSUP provide
a means to measure actual work load between the two ICPs.
With regard to report and information flow, DMDC currently generates
monthly Unit Cost Reports and sends them to NAVSUP in Washington, D.C. via the
OSD Comptroller office. NAVSUP reviews the reports and transmits them to the field
activities. Once at the field activities, there is no formal guidance as to what actions to
take.
Three NAVSUP field activities were visited and each handled the unit
cost reports differently. At one, the comptroller resource management personnel
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carefully reviewed the reports and reconciled them against their local records. They
advised NAVSUP and DMDC of the differences found. This command was concerned
with understanding and materially participating in unit cost resourcing. They expressed
their convictions that the unit cost resourcing will dramatically impact their future
resourcing. Also, this command was one of only two commands who stated their UMR
was accurate and that they use the UMR as a management tool.
At another NAVSUP field activity, the comptroller claimed to never have
seen the unit cost reports. After searching, a unit cost file was found. The current unit
cost report, bearing the comptroller's initials, had been filed in the folder. At this
command, the only action taken with the report was a review and filing. No further
action was taken with the unit cost reports and it is not clear what purpose the review
served. In addition, the command reported they spent the minimum time preparing UMR
data and that they suspect it is inaccurate. At this command, the comptroller said the
UMR is submitted to fulfill a reporting requirement. The command has implemented a
sophisticated, locally designed management information system to manage costs. No
interfaces with external systems exits.
The third NAVSUP field activity visited was somewhere between the two
described above, with regard to unit cost. The comptroller reviewed the monthly unit
cost reports, had them neatly filed and knew where they were. However, no action was
taken on them since there are no requirements associated with the reports. The purpose
in reviewing the reports was to be able to respond to NAVSUP questions should they
arise. The comptroller was well informed on the unit cost issue. Also, this activity was
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the only other activity that claimed its UMR data was accurate and used the UMR as a
management tool.
b. The Future
NAVSUP is committed to fully implementing the new unit cost concept
according to NAVSUP personnel. NAVSUP officials indicated the PUR label would
remain at NAVSUP activities. As a practical matter, unit cost will remain a major
concern with NAVSUP. However, as a result of implementing DMRD 902, an OSD
initiative to consolidate physical distribution responsibilities under DLA cognizance,
Navy depots will transfer these responsibilities to DLA by FY 1993. Consequently the
NSCs will cost substantially less to operate and should become simpler to manage. No
significant changes are expected at ICPs.
There is one significant concern highlighted by the Table 3 data. "Total
Other Output" costs represent about 48 percent of the total NSC costs. OSD and
NAVSUP have attempted to determine how to classify the "Other Outputs" such that the
output is measurable and therefore suitable to have a unit cost rate calculated. This is
of concern because of the magnitude of the costs. Until this is accomplished, OSD has
agreed to fund these costs as a fixed type budget financed from the revolving fund, but
recovered as part of the price charged to customers. This situation also exits at the ICPs,
but to a much smaller extent.
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2. MEDICINE
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, (BUMED), is responsible for
overseeing the Navy health care system. Among other responsibilities, this task includes
providing administrative and technical oversight of the Navy medical treatment facilities
(MTF), supporting centralized medical equipment procurement, providing health care
guidance and standards and overseeing the Navy portion of Civilian Health and Medical
Programs of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) system.
Since the late 1970s, the DoD health care services, in conjunction with the
office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)), have developed
a series of standard information systems to support medical operations. However, none
of the systems were designed to make resource allocations. Instead, health care
historically has been direct funded by traditional fixed budgets. In their paper discussing
patient level accounting, R. Kopperman and W. Fisch describe some of the DoD medical
information systems: (adapted from Kopperman and Fisch, 1991, pp. 1-2)
Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)-DEERS provides a
single source for determining benefit eligibility.
Composite Health Care System (CHCS) - CHCS is currently at several test sites.
The purpose of this system is to provide an integrated automated system which will
support many of the information requirements of both health care providers and
administrators. It collects data as the patient goes through the MTF, from
physicians, the pharmacy, lab tests etc. There is currently no interface between
CHCS and a cost and accounting system within DoD.
Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System (MEPRSVMEPRS allows the
comparison of workload, expense data, and manpower utilization by workcenters.
It distributes expenses through a step down process resulting in an expense per
performance factor which may be converted into a medical work unit. The
pharmacy, radiology, and pathology workcenters have some automated work load
73
capture capability which results in weighted values. MEPRS is being enhanced
with a new Expense Assignment System (EAS III) which will be able to track
expense elements before step down [allocation].
Automated Quality of Care Evaluation Support System (AOCESS) - AQCESS was
developed to report clinical, administrative, and managerial information to support
inpatient administration of DoD medical quality assurance programs. The
functional capabilities currently provided by AQCESS are available at all MTFs -
except at CHCS test sites where a new module has replaced regular AQCESS. It
contains an automated admission and disposition record per inpatient which
includes patient episodes, diagnosis and procedure.
Table 4 displays Navy health care operations data for FY 90 and 91 to provide a
magnitude of operations. No official unit cost data is available for the medical area.
TABLE 4
$ In Millions
FY 1990 FY 1991
Hospital and Clinic Costs (Total)
Cost of Operations $ 2,379.5 $ 2,742.9
Number of Hospital Admissions 199,746 191,137
Number of Out-Patients Visits ' 10,728,970 11,074,559
CHAMPUS (Total)
Cost of Operations $ 993.1 $ 1,201.7
Number of Patients Served 492,269 550,00'
'Estimate, data for FY 1991 was not available.
Data source (except for CHAMPUS FY 1991): BUMED Code 14.
a. Current Status
As with the other business area, the introduction of unit cost resourcing
will change medical care funding. A precondition to incorporating a business area into
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unit cost is to define the output. A measure called the Medical Work Unit (MWU) has
been selected as the health care unit of output. The MWU is a composite number that
represents inpatient and outpatient work loads. The inpatient work loads, called Inpatient
Work Units (IPU), measures admission and dispositions and is adjusted using a DoD
Relative Case Mix Index. Outpatient work load, called Ambulatory Work Units (AMU)
is based on clinic visits and adjusted by a weight assigned specifically to each clinic.
DMDC calculates the MWU which takes data from the MEPRS. CHAMPUS costs are
not included in the MWU defmition.
Currently, unit cost resourcing has not yet been implemented for DoD
health care but OSD is expected to include the function in FY 1993. In discussions with
representatives of BUMED, it appears that the Navy health care providers are concerned
that using the DMDC-calculated unit cost goal would provide meaningless information
since case mix and work load vary greatly by medical facility. Use of the single unit
cost goal would not properly reimburse activities for their costs. OSD guidance indicates
that this is exactly why the services, and not OSD, are tasked with properly distributing
the unit cost goals among the functional area activities.
Additionally, a BUMED representative indicated that, like the UMR,
MEPRS data is inconsistent and it may be reliable at only about half of the BUMED
commands. Again, if the underlying data is not accurate, then the unit cost information
is suspect. However, since unit cost will not be applicable to the health care function
until FY 1993, activity comptrollers could revise reporting procedure to "clean up" their
UMR and MERPS to ensure overall accuracy.
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From the BUMED perspective, the current status of unit cost is depicted
in a 2 July 1991 letter from BUMED to the DoD Comptroller. The letter provided the
BUMED evaluation on the first DMDC unit cost report for the medical area. The letter
stated:
The data contained in enclosure (1) [the unit cost report] could not be meaningfully
interpreted by my analysts as the methodology used in generating the report could
not be ascertained. If the methodology used in generating this report were known,
then data could be interpreted and more worthwhile recommendations could be
made.
Three BUMED personnel indicated that the health care area should not
be subject to unit cost resourcing. Instead, if DoD is to become more businesslike in this
area, a system similar to patient level accounting used in the private sector should be
implemented. Even if this were done, the BUMED representatives indicated CHAMPUS
should be excluded since CHAMPUS benefit payout is a function of claims submitted,
not management cost control.
Several OSD and DMDC personnel interviewed commented that they
believed the medical community expects that if the medical community does not support
unit cost resourcing for the health care function, it will not be implemented. Indications
are that unit cost resourcing for medical care will be implemented despite the lack of the
medical community support. However, when finally implemented, some have suggested




In addition to planning to move medical care costs into a revolving fund
and unit cost resourcing based on the MWU, OSD has worked on other initiatives for
health care. (OSD Paper, undated, pp. 1-3) These include:
CHAMPUS Work Unit (CHWU) - At the time that the unit cost group
determined that MWUs would be the output for MTFs, they also decided to develop a
CHWU. MWU and CHWU would be additive for comparison purposes, i.e. how much
does it cost us to provide care within the MTF compared to the overall cost of providing
that care under CHAMPUS. The unit cost group is only in the beginning stages of
CHWU development.
Establishing a Patient Level Accounting System - The primary short term purpose
of this effort is to develop some method of aggregating costs per patient within an MTF
so that the MTF can create a patient bill. Then the cost of care in the MTF can be
compare with the cost in the Catchment area under CHAMPUS. 26 This will also assist
DoD in making claims to insurers for payment under third party collections.
The long term objective of the OSD initiative is to implement detailed
patient level accounting in a standardized DoD-wide format. The general systems that
would need to be developed or modified to support improved management of DoD Health
care, including patient level accounting, are: a single DoD accounting and finance
26A "Catchment Area" is the geographic region for which a CHAMPUS administrator
is assigned responsibility.
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system; a DoD-wide enrollment system for health care beneficiaries; and, timely,
accurate CHAMPUS data at a very specific level of detail.
Recently, there has been increased pressure on the component services
to make decisions on whether to treat patients within the MTF or send them out on
CHAMPUS. As the cost of private sector health care becomes increasingly expensive,
and since DoD already owns and maintains hundreds of MTFs, this "make or buy"
decision is becoming more critical to controlling overall DoD health care costs.
ASD(HA), realizing that this was becoming an issue, awarded a contract in March 1991
to evaluate all current systems within Health Affairs and determine what might be done
regarding the development of systems for patient level accounting. Kopperman and Fisch
say that the existing systems:
... support numerous medical functions, pharmacy, patient appointing and
scheduling, laboratories, etc., [but] there is no one system that has been designed
for or can be used effectively, in its current configuration, to achieve patient level
accounting.
The overall objective for the OSD health care initiatives is to ensure that
everything fits together and creates a comprehensive approach to using health care
financial and management systems. For instance, development of a patient level
accounting system should not be segregated from development of an overall measure of
output for the MTF.
Unit cost implementation in the medical area will be an initial step
towards a patient level system. The future system will likely be able to produce patient
specific bills and also provide aggregated data useful to managing MTFs and the health
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care system, including CHAMPS. Whatever ultimately happens, the medical community
should be preparing to implement and manage under the unit cost concept in FY 1993.
3. RECRUITING
The unit cost concept will clearly provide new and potentially important
information to focus management attention on costs. The object is to provide information
that will enable managers to alfin output production with demand. This is especially true
for traditional business areas like supply operations. However, unit cost is also being
implemented in other functions not traditionally considered comparable to business. One
non-traditional business function in which the unit cost concept is being implemented is
military personnel recruiting. Table 5 provides an aggregate overview of total FY 1990
expenditures for the Navy Recruiting Command.
The Navy Chief of Personnel Office (BUPERS) is the major claimant for the
Navy Recruiting Command. BUPERS comptroller personnel (Code 02) have worked at
developing a unit cost system based on guidance from OSD. Recruitment contracts were
used as the unit of output. Contracts were made in six recruiting areas across the
country. The unit cost goal was calculated using the cost data and contract numbers.
The Code 02 personnel indicated that currently, without the aid of unit cost
information, recruiting area costs are examined. The interviews indicate that BUPERS
personnel believe the unit cost data would be of little use to the Recruiting Command,
especially at the lower management levels. Individual recruiting offices generally have
small staffs and little flexibility over their costs.
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The total cost for the Navy recruiting effort in FY 1990 was about $344.7
million excluding base operations support allocations but including the cost of military
personnel. 27 Labor (civilian and military) and advertising constitute over 81 percent of
the total recruiting budget. In addition, Navy recruiting stations frequently rent office
space together with other services. Compared to the supply and medical functions, the
TABLE 5
TOTAL NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND COSTS FOR FY7 1990
(Data provided by Chief of Personnel, Code 02)
Category of Cost Amount ($ in Millions) Percent of Total
Civilian Pay
Travel and Transport
Rents and Related Costs
Printing
Supplies and Materials























recruiting total of $344.7 million is relatively small. As the force structure is downsized,
this will likely mean fewer personnel will be recruited. 28 Given the nature of recruiting
27A small amount of reimbursable funding was not included in the Table 5 totals.
28This is true for the active forces, however, the impact on reserve forces is unclear.
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costs, the magnitude of the recruiting budget, and current force structure downsizing
efforts, it is unclear how managers will benefit from the unit cost concept in this
function.
E. IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed implementing the unit cost concept from a variety of
perspectives. The chapter discussed unit cost as a strategy, and progressed to providing
top Navy leadership views, field comptroller issues and finally addressed implementation
in several specific functional areas.
The objective of this chapter was to provide a broad overview of how unit cost is
interpreted by the potential users at many levels. The discussion in this chapter has
focused on problems in implementing the unit cost concept. This does not mean that the
unit cost concept is a bad idea. It should not be surprising to find resistance to and
potential problems with implementing a new system into an organization the size of DoD.
Unit cost resourcing represents a dramatic new management tool, which, when employed
properly, should provide unique and important information to all levels of management.
This chapter suggests that despite the many achievements to date, much work
remains in all the areas that the unit cost concept will be implemented. Additionally, the
chapter serves to highlight areas requiring attention from both unit cost developers and
users. The chapter also discussed resistance to the unit cost concept. It is
understandable why managers comfortable with one system are unwilling to accept a new
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system. It appears likely that the unit cost concept will be fully implemented at the
component level as OSD leaders have planned. Managers who continue to resist the unit
cost concept are not working to properly implement or improve the concept and thereby
will fail to make unit cost resourcing an asset for their operations. OSD leaders have
made important strides in attempting to posture DoD to successfully meet future
challenges. However, success, will come not as a result of brilliant leadership or ideas
alone. Success under the unit cost concept requires cultural changes and adoption of the
"new" values at every level of management and by each employee. This then, is the real
challenge to unit cost implementation within the Department of Defense.
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V. UNIT COST: A MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
This chapter analyzes the unit cost system objectives within a microeconomic
framework. The analysis is accomplished by applying basic microeconomic concepts to
the unit cost objectives. The analysis does not employ econometrics to prove
conclusions.
A potential limitation of an economic analysis is that the unit cost rate is a
composite rate for all activities in a support area. The economic review analyzes the unit
cost system as though each particular activity has its own unit cost goal. The analysis
is relevant because a unit cost can be developed on an activity by activity basis. OSD
guidance states this should be the goal of each DoD component.
A. OBJECTIVES OF AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OSD is attempting to structure DoD support activities to be more businesslike by
establishing producer-consumer relationships between support and line activities.
Microeconomics provides an appropriate analytical framework to examine unit cost
resourcing since microeconomics models such relationships. The analysis is also relevant
because unit cost resourcing effectively establishes markets for defense- produced goods
and. to some degree, OSD seeks to compete in-house produced output with privately
produced output.
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More fundamentally, unit cost resourcing is an OSD initiative to improve the
efficient use and allocation of scarce DoD resources. Underscoring the validity of an
economic analysis of unit cost resourcing as a resource allocation system, Edwin
Mansfield writes, "...economics is concerned with the way in which resources are
allocated among alternative uses to satisfy human wants." (Mansfield, 1988, p. 1)
Microeconomics does not provide the "right" answer. Rather, its value is as an
analytical tool within which decision makers model and predict outcomes of alternative
policies. Based on the predicted outcomes, decision makers then choose which policy
provides the most "right" outcome.
B. UNIT COST ESTABLISHES MARKET CONDITIONS
Economists study markets and the behaviors that shape markets. Unit cost
resourcing establishes market conditions by virtue of the inherent producer-consumer
relationships. Consumers choose behaviors that maximize their welfare while producers
act to maximize their profits. 29 Also, producers function under administrative or legal
constraints that presumably provide strong incentives to finish the fiscal year in the
"black." Figure 5 represents possible market structures and gives an example of an
industry that reflects the characteristics of each market type. The universe of markets
is represented by a triangle; each corner represents the pure form of that market. The
bounds of the Figure 5 universe of markets are perfect competition, monolopies and
29Under unit cost, OSD intends production operations to breakeven. However, the
profit motive exists because profit or loss are inevitable and gain sharing programs are
allowed under DoD instruction 5010. 31-G.
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oligopolies (or duopolies). Actual market structures usually contain some of each of the
pure market elements. Real activities will fall inside the triangle and, depending on the









Figure 5 also depicts defense support activities' position and the movement
expected as a result of implementing unit cost resourcing. Initially, defense support
activities are assumed to exist in the lower part of the triangle because few activities
produce the same output and may exhibit monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies.
However, as defense producers compete with each other and with private producers for
scarce resourcing, market forces are assumed to cause defense support activities to
behave more like competitive firms, that is become profit maximizing.
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C. FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS
The unit cost concept will be analyzed by applying microeconomic principles to
some of the unit cost objectives discussed earlier in Chapter HI, thus establishing a
framework for the analysis. The objectives have been reworded but retain the original
intention. The unit cost objectives to be considered are:
(1) To encourage producers to become more efficient;
(2) To encourage consumer restraint by purchasing only what they need;
(3) To encourage producers to improve decision making and provide a means to
better evaluate the performance of managers and organizations.
The remainder of this chapter will analyze the objectives stated above, but before doing
so, some economic concepts and their connection with unit cost will be discussed.
D. ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This section addresses the economic concepts and assumptions used in analyzing
the unit cost system.
1. UNIT COST IS AVERAGE TOTAL COST
The microeconomic framework is largely concerned with the issue of
marginalism and addresses concepts such as marginal cost (MC), 30 marginal revenue
30Marginal cost (MC) is defined as the addition to total cost resulting from the last
unit of output. Mathematically, MC is the first derivative of the total cost function,
a mathematical expression of a firm's cost structure.
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(MR), 31 and marginal value (MV). 32 The unit cost is the same as the microeconomics
concept of average total cost (ATC). Microeconomics recognizes the ATC information,
but indicates decisions should be based on the MC, not the ATC. The unit cost concept
uses the ATC as a focal point for decision making. Figure 6 represents the ATC (and
thus the unit cost curve), and shows how unit cost varies with output.














The marginal cost reveals the cost of the last unit of output, or the
incremental cost, while the ATC is the result of dividing total costs, including fixed
costs, by the expected level of output. ATC varies with every level of output as a result
of allocating fixed costs over all units of output at each output quantity. The MC also
31Marginal revenue (MR) is defined as the increase in total revenue from the last
unit sold. In perfectly competitive firms, MR is equal to price since each firm is a price
taker. This relationship gives a perfectly competitive firm a demand curve parallel to
the X axis since the firm can sell any quantity of output at the market price of P.
32Marginal value (MV) in a government context is defined as the increase to total
value from spending another dollar on a project.
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may vary with output, but this is a function of changes in operating costs and not
allocation of fixed costs as output changes.
2. INCREMENTAL, TOTAL AND UNIT COSTS
Knowing incremental costs is particularly valuable as the DoD budget
declines because cost-performance tradeoffs must be made in changing the military force
structure. Some believe unit cost can help provide the total and incremental cost of DoD
line operations. However, MC and not unit cost represent incremental costs. The total
of unit costs incurred by a consumer (end user line activity) overstates the amount that
would be saved if that consumer were eliminated from the DoD force structure.
An example illustrates this point. Suppose the Navy were to eliminate one
carrier battle group and the corresponding airwings. Unit cost can be used to calculate
how much output the battle group consumes. Rationalizing that this amount represents
the savings by eliminating the battle group is incorrect. All the activities that produce
the output the battle group consumes have some fixed costs. By eliminating the carrier
battle group demand, (in the short run) the same fixed costs must now be spread over a
smaller demand base. The unit cost to all remaining consumers increases. Savings result
from eliminating the battle groups. But the level of saving is the sum of the MC of the
output consumed, not the total of the unit costs. MC are the incremental cost, not the
unit cost. A factual example underscores the importance of differentiating unit cost
from incremental cost. Congress wanted to know the incremental costs of the War with
Iraq to properly fund DoD costs incurred. Congress realized these costs exceeded
amounts appropriated for FY 1991 peacetime operations and DoD is therefore entitled
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to additional funding, but only for the incremental costs. The existing accounting system
is inadequate to provide such data. Interviews with congressional staff members and the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee indicated the mistaken impression that the unit
cost concept might better support the development of incremental cost estimation for
future operations. (Johnson, 1991, p. 73)
3. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Technical efficiency is defined as obtaining the maximum output for a given
input, or minimizing the cost of a given output. Technical efficiency is achieved when
the producer operates at any point on the ATC. In contrast, economic efficiency occurs
when resources are used to produce the highest possible social value. If the objective is
to maximize economic efficiency, then the objective is to maximize the value of the
government resources used. To achieve this, government producers should produce
output at the point where MC = MV, as shown in Figure 7. This requires that price33
be set according to MC (P*), not ATC (Puc).
Unit cost sets price at the point where the ATC crosses the demand curve and
total cost equals total revenue. However, at this point the MC > MV and the output is
overproduced even though the producer will breakeven. Technical efficiency may exist,
but if the producer is overproducing, there is economic inefficiency. Presumably, the
33
In this discussion, price is assumed equal to unit cost. Although this was
demonstrated as not always the case in Chapter 4, the assumption is considered valid
because OSD intends that in the aggregate, total unit cost earnings paid producers will
equal total unit cost prices charged to consumers.
89
excess resources used could have been employed elsewhere in a manner that would have
yielded a higher MV.
















Quantity (Workload or Output)
Figure 7
4. MARGINAL COST INFORMATION IS DESIRABLE
The MC provides valuable information necessary to evaluate the optimal
output level. Unfortunately production functions and total cost functions are complex to
determine. Despite possible difficulties in determining the MC, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in OMB Circular A- 11 indicates that it is indeed
desirable to determine the MC. The Circular states (italics added):
[Budget] Estimates will be based on the most economical and efficient manner of
carrying out the work of each agency. For this purpose, unit (average) cost
information should be developed to permit comparison and analysis to determine
whether program costs are minimal. Where possible, costs should be divided into
fixed and variable components so that marginal costs can be derived in addition to
fixed costs. Such information will also provide a credible base for projections of
future costs and the need for budgetary resources...
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In contrast to the MC, the ATC (unit cost) is easily obtained by collecting
historical data (cost accumulation) and predicting output levels. The ATC is conceptually
simpler and easily executed. It is expected that when a new standardized DoD-wide
accounting systems is introduced and OSD continues to upgrade information technology,
providing unit cost data will become easier. It is possible that accounting systems will
be integrated with the unit cost programs and will automatically provide the ATC
calculation. Under these conditions, each activity may be able to easily and functionally
develop its own unit cost as along as "approved" projected output numbers are provided
for the next year. This will provide better cost information on an activity specific basis
and could possibly eliminate the need for a component area goals.
E. OBJECTIVE 1: IMPROVE PRODUCER EFFICIENCY
Encouraging efficient production and improved resource usage is a primary focus
of the unit cost concept. However, there are various notions as to what efficiency
means. This sections discusses efficiency in several respects and explores related issues.
1. THE PROFIT MOTIVE
Microeconomics assumes that the primary motivation for firms to continue
business operations is the ability to earn a profit. Businesses maximize profits by
minimizing costs and optimizing production decisions. As defense producers become
more businesslike, it is reasonable to assume that these producers will be motivated to
behave similarly. If they can lower costs, then producers can indirectly manipulate price
over time by providing output at a lower unit cost. Assuming demand is price sensitive,
91
the lower the price the more quantity consumers are willing to purchase. If a producer
does not lower prices and consumers can choose between producers, consumers will
"vote with their feet" and seek other producers to satisfy their needs at a lower cost.
Potential competition should compel defense support organizations to become
more technically efficient since this is the only way producers can influence price and
produce a profit or stay in business. This is an extension of the OSD desire for DoD
producers to become "more business-like" and would tend to support the OSD goal that
unit cost resourcing will improve efficiency.
2. SATISFYING ALL DEMAND: AN EXAMPLE PROBLEM
Defense producers are obligated to provide customers all output requested.
If demand is less than the predicted amount, then producers easily understand the need
to reduce costs because they assume they will receive inadequate earnings to cover costs.
However, when demand exceeds predicted demand, the producer may also
be at risk of having a loss. This is because defense producers may be forced to sell the
last unit of output at a price which is below the incremental cost of producing that
output, that is where MC > MR. This notion is important to understand because under
the unit cost concept, as demand increases so do earnings. Some managers think that
once they have exceed the "breakeven point," (i.e., the predicted output) that all costs
will be covered. Figure 8 graphically shows how this notion can be incorrect, depending
on the total cost function. The output Q D . is actually requested when QUP was predicted.
At output Q D , the total earnings is less than total cost and results in a loss.
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The point here is that producers are deemed to have achieved technical
efficiency if they are producing on the average total cost curve. This means that if a
producer meets unit cost goals and is technically efficient, unit cost will appear to be
achieving the objective of improving efficiency for that producer. However, when there
is a substantial imbalance between actual and predicted demand, it may appear that the
producer is not working towards achieving unit cost goals.
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Figure 8
The solution to the problem of imbalance between predicted and actual
demand appears simple. The UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE indicates that
if a component is unable to meet a unit cost goal, the component may request an increase
in the goal. However, because defense producers do not know their total cost functions,
and therefore cannot know their MC, the agency may find it difficult to justify increasing
the unit cost goal on the merit of the underlying problem. In this case, the problem is
satisfying a demand level at a point where MC > MR. The agency may justify the need
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for a higher unit cost by relating cost and demand increases. This is a crude attempt at
determining MC. If the total cost function were known, demand and corresponding cost
increases would have been predictable.
In response to a request for a higher unit cost goal, OSD would likely review
whether the component took effective actions to lower costs and obviate the need to
increase the unit cost goal. Because the unit cost is a composite rate for all activities in
the functional area, it is difficult to isolate the significance of the contribution to overall
cost from a single activity. A functional area production function could be built that
would treat the individual curves as additive, but the resultant MR and MC information
would be of little value to the individual activity. To adequately address the problem,
each activity should determine the activity specific production function.
3. EFFICIENCY IN PRACTICE
Calculating the unit cost goal is an exercise in data accumulation and output
prediction. There is no consideration for the economically optimal value of resources
used; economically efficient output is achieved by coincidence. Unfortunately, some
consider the magnitude of the unit cost as an indicator of efficiency, especially when
comparing activities and performance. This is deceptive at best and may foster an
environment that leads to inappropriate decisions. This point is further discussed in
section G below.
The unit cost goal is highly sensitive to quantity changes and total cost
allocations sensitivity to technical (production) efficiency is less clear. In other words,
unit costs may be lowered by increasing expected demand, moving costs among different
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outputs or changing allocations of indirect or G&A costs; these actions clearly have no
effect on efficiency. Alternatively, a technical efficiency improvement may reduce the
MC, but have no impact on fixed costs. Thus, the unit cost may be relatively unaffected,
depending on the ratio of fixed to variable costs and the quantity of predicted output.
However, it is reasonable to view differences in unit costs across producers
or changes in the unit cost for a particular producer as an indication that the area
deserves investigation to understand the unit cost changes. For example, changing a
management or production process that lowers the ATC (unit cost) at all output levels
indicates an efficiency improvement. Indeed, this is a change to the production and total
cost functions, so the ATC and possibly the MC will be lower.
F. OBJECTTVE 2: ENCOURAGING CONSUMER RESTRAINT
Consumers are affected by price changes as a result of the unit cost concept
implementation. It is assumed that consumers are price sensitive. Figure 9 provides
a graphic illustration of how price changes may effect consumers.
Referring to Figure 9, on a demand curve D, which is the consumers MV, if output
were free, consumers would demand output to the point where the curve crosses the x-
axis. As price increases, the quantity demanded diminishes. The optimal point of
production is where MC = MV. At this point a quantity of QMC would be demanded.
However, because producers are providing output at the point where MV = ATC,
output is actually being overproduced. A greater quantity than needed, Quc , is provided.
Note that if the demand were different, such as a demand of D', the unit cost would be
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the same because both demands cross the ATC curve. In this case, the quantity of output
is actually under produced.
Both cases serve to illustrate that the unit cost in fact has the desired effect of
reducing consumption as prices increase. The price increase communicates to the
consumer the magnitude of resources consumed in providing output. Such information
seems to encourage consumers to consider price in consumption decisions. However,
the optimal point of production, MC = MV, is not apparent, so production maybe more
or less than optimal.
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Figure 9
G. OBJECTIVE 3: IMPROVE DECISION MAKING/EVALUATIONS
OSD leaders believe that the unit cost concept will encourage better decision
making by providing new information and focusing management attention on cost data.
This section briefly discusses two areas associated with decision making: (1) comparing
96
producers; and, (2) decision makers planning horizons. In these cases, the unit cost
concept plays a significant role in the information the system provides and the incentives
provided managers in accomplishing their missions.
1. DECISION MAKING
a. Information For Decision Makers
The unit cost concept can lead decision makers to understand efficiency
in terms of the magnitude of the unit cost which, as previously discussed in section E.3,
may have little bearing on efficiency. Significant reliance on unit cost information can
provide distorted or ambiguous data on which to make decisions. The user must
recognize the significance of: the annual business assumption (i.e., assumed output);
know the costs accumulated; understand the relationship between the different types of
outputs; know what outputs are unmeasured; and, know the output used to determine the
unit cost. It is false economy to base decisions only on unit cost information.
A graphic illustration of this point is a hypothetical case where one of
two bases (producers) must be closed. Both bases provide the same output. Figure 9
shows the ATC (unit cost) curves for these producers. If the decision criteria is solely
(or even largely) a function of the unit cost comparison, the activity with the higher unit
cost would be closed. However, unit cost as an efficiency proxy provides conflicting
indications at different output levels. At Q l5 in Figure 9, Producer A appears more
efficient than B as UCA < UCB . But at 2Q 1; the reverse appears true as UCA . > UCB .
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Given only unit cost information, decision makers cannot unambiguously arrive at the
proper conclusion of which producer is most efficient.
A proper decision would be based on expected demand and an examination
of the relative MC for each producer at various demand levels. Thus, for demand
expected in the range of - Q*, Producer A should be kept. If demand were expected
to fluctuate both above and below Q*, then it is important to consider how costs change
as demand fluctuates over this range. If demand were predicted to exceed Q*, Producer
B should be kept. This case over-simplifies the decision variables but illustrates the
danger of relying solely on unit cost information.


















b. Decision Makers Are Short Term Oriented
Good DoD civilian managers and their military counterparts tend to
remain in their jobs for fairly short periods. J. R. Fox states, "The best [officer and
civilian managers] end up staying the shortest time because they get promoted or assigned
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to a better job." (Fox, 1988, pg. 177) Commenting on the planning horizon DoD
managers may have. Fox says:
Because of the military policy of relatively short assignments [speaking specifically
of military officers], performance incentives are geared to the success of short-term
tasks. ...progressing efficiently toward long term program goals are seldom
rewarding activities. They may lead to ultimate program success, but seldom lead
to outstanding performance rating for the manager. (Fox, 1988, pg. 185)
In other words, to make an impact, organizational leaders are motivated
to seek short term "fixes" (among often mutually exclusive alternatives) to meet one-year
unit cost goals rather than implement long term solutions. This is not consistent with the
long term outlook successful competitive firms must take and may serve to undermine
the long term benefits of the unit cost concept.
2. EVALUATIONS
OSD leaders have indicated that the unit cost system would improve the
ability of management to evaluate personnel performance by establishing the common
objective of successfully attaining the unit cost goal. (Shycoff interview, 1991)
a. Personnel Evaluation and Quality if Output
Currently, DoD civilians are rated against performance elements
documented in Position Descriptions (PD). Managers normally formulate PD elements
jointly with employees and review them during the evaluation period. To the extent
practical, PDs should contain objective measurable performance or quality indicators such
as maximum number of errors allowed for a function. In addition, the PD elements
should be controllable by the employee.
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The justification for using unit cost goal attainment as an evaluation basis
lies in the fact that it is objective: the goal is either met (attained) or not. Further,
employees in other activities, even if they are in a different functional area, are working
with a common system and goals established in a similar manner.
Establishing a personnel evaluation system based on attaining unit cost
goals is difficult. The constraints government managers operate under are conflicting in
nature and difficult to balance in practice. Specifically, four constraints associated with
the unit cost system are:
(1) The price for the output is set by higher authority;
(2) Managers have strong incentive to "breakeven;"
(3) Producers are obligated to satisfy all demand; and,
(4) The workforce, arguably the largest cost in government production,
behaves more like a fixed cost and is relatively inflexible to changing demand.
It can be argued that these same constraints (except price) exited under
the fixed budget method of resource allocation. They did. but the difference here is that
the suggestion of basing an evaluation system on attainment of unit cost goals subjects
managers to constraints largely beyond his sphere of control. In essence, a manager
could be judged "good" or "poor" as a result of the accuracy of the output prediction.
A central concern is that if personnel performance were to be tied to the
unit cost goal attainment, managers would have strong incentive to "game" the system.
It is most likely that quality of output will suffer since that is the one variable manager
can exercise considerable control over. Furthermore, in many organizations quality
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problems can remain undetected for long periods of time. Given the short term
orientation of DoD managers previously discussed, this issue should not be considered
lightly. Until a means to determine what a manager can control and what he cannot, it
may be prudent to exclude attaining unit cost goals from the evaluation system.
b. Organization Evaluation
Unit cost can lead decision makers and evaluators to think of the unit cost
goal as an indicator of efficiency. Evaluating organizations as "good" or "poor" because
of the relative magnitude of the unit cost goal serves little purpose. Important issues like
size, geographic location, cost of living, relative modernization of the facility and a host
of other factors that drive costs are not communicated through the unit cost goal.
Similarly, unit cost does not communicate the quality of performance or the value that
the organization provides to the system as a whole. In evaluating organizations, the cost
of the organizations should be one of many factors considered.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has analyzed the unit cost system objectives using a microeconomic
framework. There are several important points highlighted in this chapter:
(1) The unit cost concept communicates the average total cost (ATC) of production
not the marginal cost (MC) of production. Microeconomics argues that decisions should
be made on the basis of the MC and not on the ATC which is output dependent;
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(2) If defense producers are assumed to be more business-like, and to become like
competitive firms, then producers are compelled to become more efficient in order to
achieve profit or gain sharing;
(3) Consumers will reduce consumption for two reasons: (a) producers have
incentive to ensure customers are paying for all output; and, (b) prices to consumers will
increase and it is assumed customers are price sensitive;
(4) Decision makers must be aware of the ambiguities of the unit cost information
and ensure other factors are considered in decision making;
(5) DoD decisions makers are short term oriented, and the current method of
implementing the unit cost concept does not seem to improve decision making by
encouraging long term decisions;
(6) Basing personnel evaluations on attaining unit cost goals as the concept is
currently being implemented would not be prudent. Currently the evaluated personnel
may have too little control over many of the costs in the unit cost goal. Implementing
an evaluation based on unit cost goal attainment could provide incentives to "game" the
system and possibly result in lower quality output.
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VI. BASE OPERATING SUPPORT COST ALLOCATION
Thus far, this thesis has examined the overall unit cost system. This chapter
focuses on a specific portion of the unit cost concept namely, Base Operating Support
(BOS) cost allocation. The chapter defines BOS costs are and discusses why DoD needs
a cost allocation method, the distortion inherent in allocating costs, and the new thinking
the business world has adopted to reduce allocation distortion. Lastly, the chapter
includes the methodology OSD has directed DMDC to use to allocate BOS costs for use
in the unit cost calculations.
A. BOS COSTS DEFINED
In general, BOS costs are those costs associated with operating defense
installations. Categories of BOS costs are delineated in Attachment 1 to the UNIT COST
RESOURCING GUIDANCE . A general definition of BOS costs from the DoD Base
Structure Report for Fiscal Year 1991 identifies the scope and magnitude of BOS costs.
The report defines BOS costs as:
...the cost of services — goods and people — needed to operate and maintain
defense installations so that the operational forces can pursue their mission
objectives. This includes:
° Real Property Maintenance Activities - Maintenance and repair, minor
construction, operation of utilities, and other engineering support;
° Base Operating Support - Payments to the General Services Administration;
administrative and data processing activities; supply operations [other than depots
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and ICPs]; maintenance of installed equipment; bachelor housing operations and
furnishings; morale, welfare and recreation activities; and other base and service
personnel support;
° Construction - Military construction, including family housing new
construction and improvements;
Family Housing Operations and Maintenance - Family housing and
management, services, utilities, furniture and equipment, leasing maintenance, and
repair.
B. ALLOCATION
1. A COST DEFINITION REVIEW
Before proceeding, a brief review from the Chapter HI discussion on costs
is appropriate. There are three types of costs: (1) direct costs; (2) indirect costs; and,
overhead or general and administrative costs (G&A)34 . Direct and indirect costs can
be traced to a particular output or set of outputs. G&A costs, however, cannot easily be
identified to an output and generally there is no direct or causal relationship between
output and G&A costs. Accordingly, to recover G&A costs, some type of allocation
method must be devised which will spread G&A costs over output to enable producers
to recover costs.
2. THE NEED FOR A COST ALLOCATION METHOD
In FY 1991, Base Operating Support (BOS) costs accounted for almost ten
percent or $26.5 billion of the DoD appropriated funds. Traditionally, BOS costs have
34The terms G&A, BOS and overhead will be used interchangeably. However,
some G&A costs may be allocated internally and not allocated using the BOS
allocation method.
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been treated as overhead costs. The UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE
specifically defines BOS costs as part of the overhead or G&A costs incurred in a
defense support activity output. Activities that operate under the unit cost concept must
have a method of spreading or allocating BOS costs to output since the unit cost concept
is designed to recover all production costs. The practice of allocating cost is a long
established accounting practice which gave rise to the discipline of cost accounting and
its various forms such as managerial accounting. However, H. T. Johnson and R.S.
Kaplan note that cost accounting principles changed little between 1925 and the middle
1980s. (Johnson & Kaplan 1987, p. 10-14)
Government and public accountants have developed guidance or standards
which define acceptable allocation policies and practices. For example, business with
government contracts meeting certain criteria must adhere to a specific set of standards,
known as the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), developed by the Congressionally
appointed Cost Accounting Standards Board. While the CAS sets forth specific
procedures, in general the procedures establish a standardized policy or cost accounting
framework for allocating costs to government contracts. In most areas, contractors have
substantial freedom as to how costs are allocated as long as such allocation schemes are:
(1) disclosed; (2) consistent over time; and (3) do not violate standards.
3. ALLOCATION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Methods for allocating G&A costs to output are limited only by managerial
creativity and the general principle that allocation schemes are reasonable. Through the
1980s, business accounting systems tended to allocate costs on an indirect method. This
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was especially true, but not limited to manufacturing concerns. "Pooling" is an example
of one commonly used cost allocation method. This method involves combining
overhead costs into large, frequently plant-wide, "overhead pools." For each overhead
pool, managers choose some measure (such as direct labor hours or area occupied) for
allocating the cost to individual cost centers. These costs would be reflected in the cost
of the output from each cost center. Ultimately, all costs are reflected in the output
price.
Recent changes in management thinking and cost accounting practices now
recognize that cost systems that indirectly allocated costs, such as overhead pooling,
introduce information distortions. R. Cooper and R. S. Kaplan assert that indirect cost
assignment causes distortion in five ways. These are by:
(1) Allocating unrelated costs to the output;
(2) Omitting costs related to a product;
(3) Costing only a subset of the output;
(4) Indirectly assigning costs inaccurately to products, which results from:
(a) Price distortions, introduced when the cost system is too aggregated
and average prices are used in stead of specific prices;
(b) Quantity distortions, introduced when costs are assigned to products
on a basis not perfectly proportional to the resources consumed;
(5) Allocating joint or common costs.
The authors argue that the distortions can be removed by carefully designing
the product costing system. As an example they state:
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...well-designed cost systems ensure that all major outputs are treated as products
and the costs of the resources consumed in their production are assigned accurately
to them. Other sources of distortion may not be worth reducing because the cost
of reduction exceeds the benefits derived. The optimal product cost system for a
firm, therefore, is not the most accurate one but the one where the benefits of
additional accuracy are matched with the expenses of achieving the next increment
in accuracy. The best system will report approximate but inaccurate product costs,
with the degree of approximation determined by the organization's competitive,
product, and process environment. (Cooper & Kaplan, 1991, pp 3-4)
Indirect cost systems such as the pooling method, are generally simple and
inexpensive, but potentially grossly inaccurate. Implementing new or improved cost
information systems and reducing distortions will enable managers to better see the "real
story." at a cost-accuracy tradeoff; as accuracy increases, so does cost.
The concept of activity-based costing, and a more generalized form called
activity-based information, has become widely adopted to overcome information
distortions caused by traditional indirect cost assignment caused. Business managers
have come to recognize that profitability is more than an exercise of cost control. H.
Thomas Johnson says:
A new approach to management accounting must be built on "activity-based
information." This information is about the work (or activity) that consumes
resources and delivers value in a business. People consuming resources in work
ultimately cause costs and achieve the value customers pay for. (Johnson, 1988,
pp. 22-30)
There is no evidence to suggest that business is uniquely the victim of cost
system information distortion and the federal government is excluded. To the contrary,
as the OSD leadership moves DoD support operations and management to a more
business-like basis, defense support activity managers and OSD decision-makers may be
receiving distorted data, yet lacking private business experience, may fail to realize it.
107
DoD managers at every level must be knowledgeable of information distortion and make
appropriate cost-accuracy trade-offs.
C. THE BOS ALLOCATION ISSUE
Allocating BOS costs is more than simply determining how to allocate cost among
outputs. BOS costs are associated with operating installations. Most often, operational
forces and support activities coexist at the same installation. The issue then is that BOS
costs must first be allocated to activities and then, each defense support producer to
allocate costs among outputs. The unit cost concept treatment of BOS and G&A cost
allocation is largely driven by the mission or output in which the cost was incurred.
While that is one method of allocating cost, this thesis generally addresses the issue of
cost allocation from the perspective of cost drivers and benefits.
An allocation scheme that allocates installation costs to activities should be
congruent with unit cost objectives. The intent of implementing the unit cost concept is
to improve management awareness of cost and hold managers accountable for costs. In
allocating the cost of operating installations and making that allocated cost part of the unit
cost, the unit cost system may hold managers accountable for costs over which they have
no control. Thus, if the goal is to manage cost more effectively, the BOS allocation
scheme should provide allocations that support this end. The remainder of this chapter
and the next chapter will address the first problem, that of allocating BOS costs among
activities. In general, is done from the perspective of cost drivers (i.e., those actions
that incur costs) and the activities that benefit from the costs incurred.
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D. THE DOD BOS ALLOCATION METHOD
A DLA document, entitled "Unit Cost Resourcing Policies and Procedure," dated
15 October 1988, states many of the principles DoD has institutionalized as part of the
unit cost resourcing effort. Regarding allocation, the document states:
Accounting practices also recognize that this [allocation] must be done in a
reasonable manner. Thus, those costs that cannot be easily identified to a product
can be based on an allocation determination that will stand the test of
reasonableness.
This document implies that cost allocation must be accomplished on a reasonable
basis whether the allocation is for internal activity purposes or across activities. The
reasonable basis OSD has selected is people. The UNIT COST RESOURCING
GUIDANCE states:
G&A [includes BOS] costs incurred within a unit cost function shall be allocated
to the outputs of the function on the basis of personnel associated with (assigned)
to the output of the unit cost function. It is recognized that personnel may not, in
all cases, be the best basis for allocating G&A costs. However, pending further
refinement and input from the DoD Components, personnel assigned appears to be
the most consistent and reliable methodology. Personnel assigned is defined as the
number of civilian and military personnel assigned to the installation, major
command, service or agency.
In other words, BOS costs will be allocated on the basis of the pro-rata share of the total
BOS cost to each activity at an installation based on the number of personnel assigned
to each activity as a percentage of the installation population. DMDC accumulates BOS
costs by using service specific cost accounting codes 35 .
35The cost accounting codes differ by service. The Navy uses Cost Accounting
Costs (CACs). Definitions for CACs are in the Navy Comptroller Manual, Volume
II, paragraph 024640.
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A simple example illustrates this method. Suppose one installation has three
activities (A, B and C) and the total BOS cost at the installation is $10,000. Activity A
has 25 personnel, Activity B has 40 personnel and Activity C has 35 personnel assigned.
The OSD selected allocation scheme would allocate $2500, $4000 and $3500 to activities
A, B and C respectively, regardless of the differences among the activities.
This allocation method was adopted for three reasons: (1) the method is
conceptually simple and thus easy to program; (2) OSD leaders wanted to quickly
implement the unit cost concept and DMDC maintains a database which contains the
manpower information; and, (3) "personnel" represents a common denominator among
activities and is considered a "reasonable" basis.
The OSD method of allocating BOS costs is a "pooling" method, and the base used
is personnel. As such, it is an indirect allocation method subject to the five sources of
data distortions discussed in section B.3. These distortions are: (1) allocating unrelated
costs to the output; (2) omitting costs related to a product; (3) costing only a subset of
the output; (4) indirectly assigning costs inaccurately to products as a result of price and
quantity distortions; and, (5) allocating joint or common costs. The distortions could
affect defense decisions.
The need to determine the total BOS costs and allocate these costs among activities
is a significant part of the unit cost implementation effort. As such, it has became a
major tasking for DMDC. DMDC needed to build command host-tenant relationships
and devise the programs to extract appropriate data from the Uniform Management
Reports. The results of the DMDC effort are discussed in Chapter VII.
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed the reasons OSD requires a Base Operating Support (BOS)
cost allocation method, problems and data distortions inherent in indirect allocation
schemes and current business management thinking on how to approach the problems.
The chapter is concluded by describing the method OSD has selected for BOS allocation.
To provide component-level data, the unit cost programs aggregate costs and
allocate them indirectly. It is reasonable to suggest that the OSD- selected allocation
scheme introduces considerable distortion into the unit cost goals as R. Cooper and R.
Kaplan explain, citing five sources of distortion related to aggregating data and allocating
costs indirectly.
The next chapter will analyze the OSD allocation method by examining the DMDC
allocation program and comparing DMDC-provided data and field collected data. An
example allocation scheme is developed and compared to the OSD allocation method.
Ill
VH. BOS PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter describes the program developed by DMDC and approved by OSD
to allocate Base Operating Support (BOS) costs for use in calculating unit cost goals.
Additionally, the allocation method is analyzed by reviewing DMDC ad hoc query
reports and by comparing expected output from the DMDC program to an example
allocation scheme developed based on data collected from field activities.
This chapter does not propose an alternate allocation scheme nor suggest that the
OSD-selected model is wrong. As discussed in Chapter VI, indirect allocation methods
are subject to distortion. The example alternative allocation method presented in this
chapter is also an indirect allocation system and introduces distortions. However,
because the scheme introduces at least one more allocation basis and costs are selectively
allocated, distortions may be mitigated to some degree.
A. BOS ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES AND COMPLICATIONS
In principle, the BOS allocation system is merely determining the total BOS costs
at each installation and then allocating those costs to each activity for inclusion into the
function area unit cost goal. The allocation is made on the basis of the percentage of the
installation population each activity represents. From the DMDC perspective, the
principles of this scheme are easier to articulate than it is to program.
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As the Central Design Agent for the unit cost program, DMDC is responsible for
developing and maintaining the DoD-wide unit cost concept program. Problems
currently facing DMDC in establishing the BOS allocation programs for the Navy
include: complex, overlapping and confusing host-tenant relationships; component
specific cost accounting differences; missing data; and, poor component support to
resolve problems.
B. BOS ALLOCATION PROGRAM STRUCTURE
Appendix B provides a graphic model of the Unit Cost System Design. For the
Navy, calculation of the BOS cost allocation starts with identifying three elements:
(1) The number of civilian and military personnel assigned to each activity.
Personnel have been designated as the allocation base. The number of personnel
assigned to activities is extracted from the data base DMDC maintains on the civilian and
military workforce;
(2) Installation host-tenant relationships. This information was built as part of the
Navy BOS cost allocation programming effort in summer 1991; and,
(3) The proper costs to accumulate. A table, which is part of the program system,
identifies the BOS costs by Cost Account Code (CAC). 36 This information was
developed using CACs found in the Navy Comptroller Manual Volume n, paragraph
0242640.
36The "table" concept was programmed into the most recent version of the DMDC
system of programs that provide unit cost data. Previously the CACs were a part of the
program code.
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These elements are merged together to form the Base Operations File (ABOP).
The ABOP is keyed to installations by a DMDC-assigned base identification code
(BASID). Individual commands are cross referenced to the BASED by the command
unique Unit Identification Code (UIC), creating the host-tenant relationship, explained
below. The BOF file is then matched against the Cost Account Financial File (CAFF)
which provides the actual financial (cost) data. Cost account data that does not match
a BOF record is placed in a suspense file for further research. The merger of the BOF
and CAFF create the Master Base Operations File (BASEOP). This is the file from
which the various kinds of reports are generated. Here, the total of BOS costs allocated
from all installations is accumulated and applied to the functional areas as a G&A cost.
C. HOST-TENANTS: THE HEART OF THE BOS ISSUE
The DMDC allocation program is driven by the "host-tenant" relationship, and
missions assigned to each UIC. The host-tenant relationship is built by linking BASEDs
and UICs. The host-tenant relationship and related issues are further explained here.
1. THE HOST-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
Most installations are organized such that there is a single command
responsible for providing "landlord" type services. The landlord is called the "host."
Commands that receive services from the host are called "tenants. " Services provided
include operations and maintenance of the installation, facilities and real property,
administration and administrative support, military personnel housing, personnel support
and other services that enable commands and personnel to utilize the installation to
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pursue mission objectives. (A detailed listing of the costs of these is provided as
Attachment 1 to the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE .)
Host commands historically have been provided services as part of their mission.
Traditionally, they have been funded with fixed budget to provide a certain level of
service to tenants on a non-reimbursable basis. This is called "mission funded." When
a tenant desired service beyond the scope of the mission funded service level, the tenant
requested and received service on a reimbursable basis.
Under the fully implemented unit cost concept, mission funded service will no
longer exist. All services (BOS costs) will be allocated to some output and the costs will
be reflected as G&A in the unit costs.
2. BASE) AND UIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS
Assigning UICs to BASIDs is a logical method to establish host-tenant
relationships necessary to allocate BOS costs. UICs appear to be assigned to only one
BASID. There are two significant issues that arise as a result of assignment of UICs to
only one BASID, referred to here as "cross allocation" and "free riding."
a. The Cross Allocation Problem
It is important to note that the host-tenant relationships can often overlap
or "flip-flop." In such cases it could be appropriate to allocate BOS costs from host to
tenant in both directions simultaneously. An example serves to clarify this point.
Commander, Naval Supply Center San Diego (NSCSD) "owns" and
occupies a building and serves as a host to several commands. Commander, Naval
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Station San Diego (SDNS), the host at the Naval Station, occupies some space in the
NSCSD compound. In this case SDNS is the tenant at the NSCSD compound.
However, NSCSD operates warehouse space at the SDNS. In this case NSCSD is the
tenant at the naval station. In this example, it would be appropriate to allocate a share
of SDNS BOS costs to NSCSD for warehouse operations. Likewise, it is appropriate to
allocate a share of NSCSD BOS costs to NS for the space they occupy in the NSCSD
compound. For convenience, call this "Hip-flop" allocation, "cross allocation."
The BASID report seems to display organizations arranged in a
hierarchical relationship (with respect to host-tenant relationships). The BASID file
seems to have UICs assigned only once to a particular BASID. In assigning a UIC
uniquely to a BASID, cross allocated BOS costs cannot occur. This causes a failure to
cross allocate BOS costs and diminishes the matrix nature of Navy organizations
providing support to one another.
b. BOS Cost Free Riders
Assigning UICs to only one BASID causes a problem perhaps more
serious than failure to cross allocate costs. There are cases where the BOS costs are
assigned to a particular BASID, but many activates receive the benefit of the cost
incurred. Activities that do not receive a portion of the cost are said to "free ride."
Because some activities are free riding, activities assigned to the BASID where the BOS
cost are charged receive a disproportionately larger share of BOS costs.
An example of this is the cost of San Diego area fire protection services
funded by the Commander, San Diego Naval Base (CSDNB) and servicing all Navy
116
commands in the San Diego area. Fire department costs for CSDNB were almost $16.5
million in FY 1990. CSDNB (U1C N00242) is attached to San Diego Naval Supply
Center (BASID 02006005). Under the DMDC program, the BOS costs will be allocated
only to those activities assigned to BASID 02006005, which represent a small percentage
of the total number of commands in the San Diego area. These comments are based on
a review of DMDC BASID reports that displays the cross reference between the BASIDs
and UICs supported at each installation.
3. BASID AND UIC ASSIGNMENT CORRECTION
It is not known if the program structure is unable to accommodate the inter-
relationships or if the inter-relationships simply have not been entered into the data base.
The second alternative is likely since DMDC lacked adequate data from the Navy when
the Navy BOS programming effort started in the summer of 1991. In either case, it
seems clear that not cross allocating BOS costs increases the distortion in the unit cost
reports.
The OSD and DMDC should consider methods to correct this issue. One
method would be to revise the BASID files to reflect the need for cross allocation
between and among commands. However, DMDC can not do this without significant
Navy assistance. NAVCOMPT collected BOS cost data during November 1990. This
data could be compared to the BASID file on a case by case basis to determine which
UICs should be added to particular BASIDs. Unfortunately, this is probably a manual
effort. Alternatively, a new request to installations to provide a machine readable copy
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of the commands they support, prepared with a commonly used data base program, might
provide the information needed and reduce the manual effort.
4. INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS
The UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE indicates it is desirable for
host activities to execute agreements with each tenant who receives services from the
host. The agreements, known as Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISA), are a contract
between the service provider (host) and service receiver (tenant) and set forth what
service will be provided and what payment is expected.
Services can be provided on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis,
depending on how activities are funded, the nature of the service and the relationship
between commands. Frequently, activities within the same major claimant will establish
non-reimbursable ISAs. Across claimants, the host usually desires reimbursable funding
for service provided, unless the activity is mission funded to provide such activity.
5. ACCOUNTING SYSTEM SHORTFALLS AND ISAS
Ideally, all the support a host provides would be documented in reimbursable
ISAs and each activity would pay the agreed price. The amount of BOS costs remaining
would theoretically represent the BOS costs for which the host is responsible. If this
were done, there would be no need to allocate BOS costs as each command has "paid
their fair share. " Usually, the case is that some of the support costs are paid under ISAs
and some of the support costs are non-reimbursable because the host has been mission-
funded to provide the support. (Other situations exist, but are omitted for simplicity.)
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It would seem logical that if a tenant establishes an ISA with the host which
includes all the costs the tenant will incur, then that tenant should be excluded from
receiving a potion of the BOS cost allocation. Furthermore, if the ideal situation existed
and all host-provided service costs are reimbursable through ISAs, then all tenants should
be excluded from the allocation.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. DMDC personnel have indicated that the
current DoD accounting system cannot provide sufficient information to enable DMDC
programmers to appropriately exclude activities from BOS cost allocations. The
accounting system records the reimbursements transactions as they are reported, so
DMDC can determine total reimbursable amounts. With this information, DMDC
programs deduct the total amount of the reimbursable orders from the total BOS costs
allocated.
It would seem that ISAs can potentially establish conditions under which
tenants either subsidize each other or the host. When a producer has an ISA and pays
the agreed amount, that amount is reduced from the total allocable BOS costs. If another
tenant, also a producer operating under the unit cost constraints without an ISA, only
pays the allocated amount, the producer with the ISA may be subsidizing the producer
without the ISA since both receive an allocation of BOS costs under the DMDC program.
Producers should only pay the BOS costs allocated since that is the amount that will be
recovered by the unit cost goal. Accordingly, it would appear that tenants should cancel
existing ISAs and refrain from executing new ISAs unless they exclude BOS costs since
the BOS allocation method will automatically allocate a portion of BOS to the producers.
119
As an alternative to discontinuing current ISAs, all tenants at an installation
could be required to establish ISAs with the host. The host could advise DMDC not to
make BOS allocation for that installation. 37 The BOS costs paid on the negotiated ISAs
would become internal G&A and treated like indirect costs.
D. DATA AND PROGRAM PROBLEMS
Assuming the unit cost conceptual framework is sound, (i.e., output definitions are
correct, etc.) problems identified in DMDC-generated reports generally come from two
sources: (1) the data DMDC used to generate the report is flawed in some way; or, (2)
the DMDC program is incorrectly coded thereby producing erroneous reports. DMDC
is concerned with both problems. DMDC is not staffed to routinely verify financial data,
which is received in machine readable format. Rather, the data is taken at face value,
entered into the appropriate database and used for report generation. As reports are
reviewed, usually by component representatives, problem areas are noted and DMDC
corrects the problems to the extent possible. DMDC personnel appeared highly
motivated to correct errors.
As an example of a problem with erroneous incoming data, DMDC personnel took
action to adjust for a situation where it appeared local comptroller personnel were using
CACs incorrectly. It was noted that many non-supply commands reported costs that
reflected outputs which only ICPs or depots should report. The conclusion was that field
37DMDC personnel indicated this condition can be programmed on an installation
by installation basis.
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activity comptroller personnel were coding local base supply operations with CACs that
should only be used by depots or ICPs. DMDC personnel suppressed the generation of
ICP and depot costs inappropriately reported by only allowing depot or ICP costs to be
identified for depots and ICPs. The depot and ICP costs from the non-supply activities
are now reflected in Other Missions. While this solution may not be precisely correct,
it is known that the current reporting of ICP and depots costs from non-supply activities
is not accurate.
An example of DMDC correcting program related problems is the identification of
incorrect or inappropriate host-tenant relations which would lead to an incorrect
allocation of BOS. In reviewing the early BASID listings (during the summer of 1991),
a number of problems were identified which DMDC personnel promptly corrected.
E. COMPARISON METHODOLOGY
The following describes the methodology for comparing the OSD-selected method
of BOS cost allocation to an example BOS cost allocation:
1
.
Field activities were selected for data collection and field comptrollers were
requested, in advance, to accumulate data for review during trips to the field activities;
2. DMDC prepared ad hoc query reports to provide baseline data that the DMDC
programs would use to calculate the BOS allocation;
3. The BOS values were developed by a reviewing DMDC baseline data and comparing
it to data collected. To the extent possible, inconsistencies were resolved. The allocated
BOS costs reflect actual data, but do not necessarily reflect all costs. For example,
military personnel costs were omitted since activities do not pay these costs;
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4. A roster of personnel assigned to the installation, by activity, was developed by
comparing DMDC data to field data. Using this roster, total BOS cost were allocated
on the basis of personnel. The allocation results produce "expected" results using the
OSD-directed allocation method;
5. An allocation scheme was designed based on the field activity data that was collected.
The alternate scheme was applied to the adjusted data resulting in a second allocation;
6. The allocation results based on the OSD method was compared against the alternate
allocation method;
7. Conclusions were reached based on the above the methodology.
F. LIMITATION OF RESULTS ACCURACY
The focus of this thesis was not to develop an alternate method. The alternate
allocation method is presented for illustration purposes only. The data used to analyze
the OSD-selected allocation method is based on actual FY 1990 data collected from field
activities during August and September of 1991 and baseline cost data from DMDC
reports. The DMDC baseline data was also generated from the FY 1990 data in the
DMDC data base. As a result of the adjustments made to the data and possible problems
with the DMDC reports as a result of inaccurate UMR reports, the data underlying the
allocations is not necessarily reflective of actual operating results. The alternate
allocation method is only an example. It serves to point out differences obtained when
changing the allocation scheme. The correlation results are not definitive, but highlight
the possibility that in the future, alternate allocation methods could be developed that
would more accurately allocate BOS costs. An improved allocation scheme could
improve the alignment of unit cost goals with the objectives of the unit cost system.
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1. CONSTRAINTS
The field data collected was subject to many constraints. Chief among them
were: data availability, the ongoing developmental nature of the unit cost program, and
the limited time available. A DMDC baseline data report was not available at the time
data collection occurred. This report would have helped to identify data deficiencies and
provided guidance for data reconciliation during the field activity data collection. The
Navy portion of the BOS allocation program was recently developed (summer 1991) and
changed during development. There was insufficient time to collect data from every
command at each installation visited. For these reasons, the field data collected is
incomplete and the DMDC data base cannot be validated. Additionally, paucity of field
data constrained the sophistication of the example allocation model.
2. DATA INCONSISTENCIES
Another factor impacting the accuracy of the results is the significant potential
discrepancies between the DMDC data and the field data analyzed. For example,
personnel, commands related by BASID and military personnel cost, were found to differ
between the DMDC data and the field data. Some of the specific differences are
addressed under the discussion for each activity. Additionally, there was at least one
CAC that was questionable to include as a BOS cost.
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G. SITE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
Sites for collecting data were selected on the basis of activity type and proximity
to other areas to which travel was desired. Travel was constrained by time and funds
available.
DMDC personnel provided significantly more data for San Diego Naval Station
(SDNS) and San Diego Naval Supply Center (SDNCS) than other installations. For this
reason, the review for these two installations was more detailed than the other
installations. However, the example allocation was only done for SDNS. The results
are presented in section I. The comments regarding data observations for these two
installations that are similar to data at the other installations are not repeated. A data
review for Norfolk Naval Base was not completed for reasons explained in the following
section. Appendix B lists the activities selected and visited.
H. GENERAL COMMENTS FROM DATA REVIEW
The objective of the unit cost system is to properly align costs with outputs. A
similar objective should be to align costs with the activities that derive benefits from the
cost. Potential problems with the BASID/UIC assignment tend to undermine this
objective. Similarly, over-burdening outputs with costs allows another way to obtain a
"free ride."
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1. FREE RIDESG AT SUPPLY ACTIVITIES
The DMDC report does not display BOS costs for the Oakland Naval Supply
Center (NSCO). The NSCO comptroller reported $35.6 million in direct base operating
costs. The absence of BOS costs was also observed on the San Diego Naval Supply
Center and Navy Ships Parts Control Center DMDC-BASEOPS reports.
The reason supply activities do not display BOS costs is that NAVSUP and
DMDC agreed on which CACs should be included in the depots and ICP functions. The
mapping for these CACs is provided in Appendix C. The mapping attributes all of the
BOS costs at the depots and ICPs to depot and ICP output. Unfortunately, this scheme
appears to overlook the fact that some of those costs are properly allocated to tenants,
thus allowing them to "free ride." A review of the ISAs indicates that allocable costs
such as command and administration (CAC 1A**) are not being recovered by
reimbursement. This is probably because these costs have traditionally been considered
mission funded and were non-reimbursable.
NAVSUP should consider reviewing how BOS costs are allocated to tenant
activities at appropriate installations and ensure tenants receive a "fair share" allocation
of the BOS costs. If costs incurred at supply activities are properly allocable to other
tenants, then the supply output functions are being unduly burdened with BOS costs
which could make supply output unnecessarily expensive to supply customers.
2. BASH) REPORT AND ACTUAL TENANTS
There are inconsistencies between the UICs linked to BASIDs and the tenants
that host activities reported. When commands are missing or erroneously assigned to a
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BASID, two problems occur: (1) the personnel corresponding to the incorrectly assigned
UIC are also incorrectly assigned (present or missing). Depending on command size, this
could significantly impact allocations; and, (2) the users of host services are improperly
aligned with the costs. Some specific data is provided in the discussions of each activity
visited.
I. NORFOLK NAVAL BASE
The Norfolk Naval Base area, (DMDC BASID 02051006) is home to hundreds of
Navy and other military commands. Nowhere is the need for "cross-allocation" more
necessary than here. Because of the complexity and command interdependencies, it was
determined that reviewing data from this installation placed it beyond the scope of this
thesis. However, several observations can be made:
(1) Norfolk Naval Base (NNB) is not actually a physical installation. The physical
bases located within the purview of NNB jurisdiction include the Norfolk Naval Station
(NNS), Norfolk Air Station (NAS) and the Headquarters Support Command (HSA);
(2) DMDC should consider assigning separate BASIDs for the commands listed
in paragraph (1). They are identifiable as separate entities and generally provide services
to substantially different tenants. By including all these commands into a single BASID,
it appears that many BOS costs are being inappropriately allocated to tenants that receive
no benefit from them (e.g., allocating NNS BOS costs to NAS tenants);
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(3) NNB should retain its BASID because it funds some common services such as
the fire protection services and common perimeter security;
(4) There are 269 command UlCs listed within the NNB BASID, but at least one
major command is missing. Norfolk Naval Supply Center (NNSC)38 is physically
located at NNS and NAS and is within the NNB jurisdiction. NNSC should receive a
NNB BOS allocation, yet it will not unless it is loaded into the BASID file. The
underlying problem probably results from the program not recognizing matrix-like
relationships discussed in section C.l, C.2.a. No further work was done with Norfolk
data.
J. SAN DIEGO NAVAL STATION
1. TENANTS AND EMPLOYEES
The San Diego Naval Station (SDNS) (BASID 02006004, UIC 00245) has
66 different commands attached to its BASID. A 4 December 1990 letter from SDNS
provides BOS data requested by NAVCOMPT for the DMDC database. In that letter,
SDNS personnel reported that they provided support to 49 tenants and 74 ships
homeported at the San Diego Naval Station. Data collected indicated there are 51
commands supported. Of these, 38 occupy building space for which SDNS is
responsible.
38NNSC is one of the largest commands at NNB in terms of square feet of building
space occupied. NNSC "owns" its own buildings, and the host-tenant relationship
between NNSC the other commands changes depending on the command occupying
the building under review.
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The SDNS tenant list was compared to the DMDC BASID report. Twenty-
six tenants SDNS claims they support were missing from the DMDC report. (Among
those missing was NSC San Diego, as discussed in paragraph C.2.a.) However, the
DMDC report contained a number of commands not listed on the SDNS tenant list. The
personnel associated with the additional and missing commands resulted in a net
difference of 677 personnel. SDNS reported 9922 and DMDC reported 10599.
One possible explanation for the discrepancies is that the Navy may assign
multiple UICs to the same command to capture different activities at that command. This
assignment method may not have been accounted for in the DMDC programming effort.
This comment is supported by the DMDC report which contains many training
commands, each assigned a small number of personnel, which the SDNS data does not
indicate. Instead, SDNS reports the Fleet Training Center (U1C 61690) with a large
population. Appendix D, compares the two reports. The forty-one UICs listed on the
DMDC report but not on the SDNS report are not shown.
2. FINANCIAL DIFFERENCES
SDNS had a FY 1990 budget of $32. 1 million, yet the DMDC BASOPS
report shows a total of $87.6 million for SDNS BASE OPERATIONS. The 4 December
1990 SDNS letter indicated that SDNS spent $11.1 million in BOS costs during FY 1990
and an additional $7.4 million for Maintenance of Real Property (MRP). This leaves a
$69.1 million difference between the DMDC BASOPS report and the data in the 4
December 1990 SDNS letter.
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$30.9 million of the $69.1 million difference is attributable to the cost of
military personnel which SDNS did not pay but should be reflected in UMR data. A
review of the remaining costs did not conclusively resolve the $38.2 million discrepancy.
A part of the problem may lie in the areas of Public Works Center provided support.
A total $28.1 million is reported in this area. The large magnitude of the Public Works
related numbers makes them suspicious. Furthermore, the Public Works Center at San
Diego Naval Station is a tenant, not a part of the SDNS command, but is reported on the
SDNS BASID report. It is possible that the Public Works Center costs were commingled
with SDNS costs in the automated data collection function.
If this is true, allocating the costs as the DMDC BASE OPS report shows is
inappropriate. Services from the Public Work Centers are provided as requested by
individual commands, presumably on a reimbursable basis. Those costs should be
included against the mission of the requestor. Including Public Works costs as part of
the allocable BOS costs misabgns costs and users. It spreads costs to other activities who
have not benefitted. Nonetheless, these costs were left in for the example allocation.
Another item of concern is $9.4 million of BOS costs attributable to the Navy
Drug and Alcohol Program Management. The CAC for the item in question is 998K,
defined as "Alcohol Abuse Education, NASAP." It is believed that this cost should not
be reported as a BOS cost. It may have been included because it is considered a
personnel support cost, which are defined in the UNIT COST RESOURCING
GUIDANCE as BOS costs. However, this activity more closely resembles a training or
medical activity, and could possibly stand alone as an activity for unit cost.
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The last observation is that $2.9 million was reported under CAC 6615. This
CAC is not defined in the most recent change to the NAVCOMPT manual Volume II
,
(dated 22 October 1991). The 66** series is related to transportation equipment rental,
operation, and maintenance. It is possible that this code existed earlier in FY 1990 but
has been deleted.
3. EXAMPLE ALLOCATION
The results of the example allocation are found in Appendix D. The method
used was to compare the DMDC-provided data to the data collected at SDNS. The
remainder of this section describes the development and rational for the example
allocation.
a. Employees
Personnel numbers assigned to activities were based on DMDC data and
SDNS data were developed and provided for comparison purposes. As previously noted,
there are inconsistencies between the DMDC data and the SDNS data. However, the
graph in Appendix D, shows a generally positive correlation between the DMDC data
and the SDNS data. The personnel data is reflected in Appendix D by showing the
percent of personnel in each activity relative to the whole installation. Calculating the
allocation expected by using the "OSD-method" was based on these percentages.
b. Dollars
The dollars amounts used to accomplish the allocation were based on the
DMDC report. The example data omitted the $30.9 million of military personnel
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(salaries, etc.) and the $9.4 million for the Drug and Alcohol Abuse treatment program.
The total allocated amount was $56.6 million.
c. Costs
Costs were categorized by referring to the NAVCOMPT manual and
identifying the CACs in the DMDC report. For simplicity, and to match the data
available, total BOS costs were grouped into five broad categories. These categories are:
(1) Command, Administration and Service Support (Command);
(2) Personnel Administration (Personnel);
(3) Rental and Other Transportation Costs and Vehicle Maintenance and
Operations, (Transport);
(4) Minor Construction, Real Property & Facility Maintenance and
Operations, (Real Property);
(5) Security and Related Costs (Security).
d. Basis
The example allocation was developed using two basis: (1) personnel
assigned to TJICs; and, (2) building space occupied expressed in square feet. These basis
were used because they appear to drive many of the BOS costs. However, some of the
costs are clearly driven by a combination of space and personnel. In addition, there were
some cases where an activity has an imbalance between space and personnel. For this
reason, a third basis, based on both space and personnel was developed. The third basis,
called "PEOPLE SQ-FT" in the Appendix D tables, combines space and personnel by
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multiplying the base wide average of square feet per person by the number of personnel
assigned to the activity and adding to it the number of square feet the activity occupies.
In a simplistic manner, allocations made on the basis of this calculation accounts for the
personnel-space imbalance. These three basis were selectively applied to the cost
categories as follows:
COST CATEGORY BASIS FOR ALLOCATION
Command Person-Sq Ft
Personnel Number of Personnel
Transport Number of Personnel
Real Property Sq Ft
Security Number of Person-Sq Ft
The three bases do not represent sophisticated cost accounting methods. However, it
seems intuitive that there is some causal relationship between the cost categories and the
basis selected for allocating each cost category. As indicated, calculating expected data
from the "OSD-method" was done strictly on the number of personnel assigned to each
activity as a percentage of the base population.
e. Interpreting Jlie Results
If the cost data is allocated on basis that includes other than personnel,
it reduces the correlation between personnel and the allocated costs. If it is assumed that
the additional basis used for allocating costs more closely reflects the cost driver, then
the resulting allocations may contain less distortion than the OSD-selected method.
However, there is insufficient data to definitively make this statement. What is clear,
and the main point of this exercise, is that allocating the BOS costs using more than one
basis makes a difference. The difference is improvement if important causal relationships
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have been included in the allocation. The issue then becomes, what is the value of
improving the accuracy of the allocation method to reduce data distortion.
K. NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER SAN DIEGO
1. TENANTS AND PERSONNEL
The DMDC BASEOP file for the Naval Supply Center San Diego (SDNSC)
displays 36 UICs assigned to BASID 02006005 and assigns a total of 4,826 personnel to
this installation. SDNSC provided documents reflecting that they support nineteen
resident tenants and provide support to sixteen non-resident commands. According to
SDNSC records, there are a total of 1,448 personnel assigned to the tenant commands
at the SDNSC compound.
This significant difference is probably a result of commands attached to the
SDNSC BASID having employees at remote locations. Appendix E summarizes the
personnel assignments by command. A graph is provided which visually highlights the
differences. Like the SDNS graph, this shows a generally positive correlation between
the DMDC report and the local data. Missing commands are not indicated.
The DMDC report also listed seventeen commands that have no apparent
relationship to SDNSC. These commands are neither located at the NSC compound nor
receive tenant type services from SDNSC. Additionally, there were five commands
missing from the DMDC report which SDNSC claims they support (indicated by "0"
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under the caption "DMDC PEOPLE"). However, these five commands only accounted
for a total of 77 personnel according to SDNSC records.
2. ALLOCATION
Reviewing the DMDC reports for the BOS costs incurred by activities linked
to BASID 02006005 indicated it is inappropriate to allocate the BOS costs incurred for
this BASID only to activities assigned to this BASID. The BOS costs incurred by the
commands attached to the SDNSC BASID provide common service benefit all nearly
commands in the San Diego area. These costs provided services such as: fire protection,
communications, disbursing, and personnel support services. Since SDNSC is a supply
activity, (even though it is the host), the DMDC CAC mapping for supply activities does
not separately report BASE OPS costs. SDNSC BOS costs are allocated to supply
activity outputs. The commands linked to the SDNSC BASID and their reported BOS
costs are:
Command Amount of BOS ($ in millions)
Commander, Naval Base San Diego $28.9
Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center 48.6
Office of Civilian Personnel Management 2.3
Personnel Support Activity 10.3
Naval Communications Station 16.7
Total BASID 02006005 BOS costs $106.8
This installation provides an example of both types of "free riding" discussed in
section C.2.b. These were: (1) host supply activity tenants incur a free ride because the
depots and ICPs charge their BOS type costs to their outputs rather than allocate it to
their tenants; and, (2) all the BOS costs associated with the BASID are allocated only to
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those activities or functions assigned to the BASID, which allows the majority of those
who benefit to receive the services for no cost (such as communications, personnel, etc.).
This approach especially burdens the supply activities, since they allocate all their BOS
cost to their output and receive a disproportionate share of other BOS costs.
L. NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER
The Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) list of tenants is consistent with the
DMDC BASID report with two exceptions. The DMDC BASID report does not list as
a tenant, the Defense Depot Region East (DDRE), a Defense Logistics Agency supply
depot. DDRE was formed by consolidating several depots, including the Defense Depot
Mechanicsburg (DDM) located at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, within the SPCC
compound.
According to SPCC records, DDRE warehouse operations account for 1,130 or
17% of the 6,548 personnel assigned to commands within the SPCC compound.
Additionally. DDRE utilizes 1.8 million square feet of outdoor space, accounts for 26
percent of the administrative spaces and 28 percent of the covered warehouse space.
These numbers could alter a BOS allocation if they were included in the SPCC BASID.
The DMDC BASID report does reflect the now non-existent DDM organization
(UIC 31093) to which one person is shown as assigned. Additionally, there is an activity
with no name and the UIC "DDMP" which reflects 42 personnel assigned.
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A key issue identified was that the DMDC program establishes unique relationships
between installations and commands. Installations are assigned an identifier called the
"BASID" which is linked with command UICs. UICs seem to be assigned to only one
BASID. This feature prevents the program from making allocations which could
minimize the data distortion for unit cost purposes. Several specific data issues were
identified that may impact data quality and the BOS cost allocations. These include
possible erroneous data entries and questionable BASID-UIC assignments. DMDC
should consider examining these areas.
For NAVSUP activities, it was noted that because of the NAVSUP/DMDC
agreement on which CACs should be allocated to depot or ICP output, depots and ICPs
do not reflect BOS costs that could be allocated to tenant activities. NAVSUP should
consider reviewing BOS costs at installations where a supply activity is the host. This
review should determine whether BOS costs should be allocated to tenants.
Alternatively, NAVSUP should investigate the possibility of capturing some of the host
costs on the ISAs. ISAs reimbursement can help legitimately reduce the need to recover
host service costs when such costs are unrelated to the output.
Lastly, the chapter presented an example alternate allocation method. The example
was developed to illustrate differences obtained between an alternate allocation method
and the OSD-selected method. The method is not suggested as an alternative to the
OSD-method. The method does suggest pursuing additional study to determine an
method allocation that would provide less distorted data. One method that would be
appropriate is an activity-based allocation system. This method correlated activity
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directly with cost and as such, is a direct allocation method that will distort data less than
the indirect method presented here.
Before initiating studies into an improved alternate allocation methods, the issue
of cost tradeoffs should be addressed. As noted earlier the increase in data accuracy
carries a higher cost than the present allocation system. To a large extent, the unit cost
concept success is based on whether managers believe that the system is providing useful
information to users. If G&A, and especially BOS costs, constitute a significant portion
of the unit cost goal, then it is important that such cost allocations be reasonably and
accurately allocated. In this way managers will understand they are being held
responsible for costs which they can exert some control or management.
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Vm. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I provided a discussion of the background and changing environment which
has caused the DoD budget to dramatically decline. The concept of unit cost resourcing
as an evolution of the management was presented.
Chapter E traced the history of the defense resource and allocation system,
highlighting important milestones since 1921. The chapter emphasized that the unit cost
concept is not totally new. Its origins can be found as early as 1932. However, unit
cost as a DoD-wide management system is new. Lastly, the chapter focused on recent
history which gave rise to the introduction of the OSD unit cost initiative.
Chapter m presented the unit cost conceptual framework and how the unit cost
concept can be implemented. An important part of implementing the unit cost concept
was the Defense Review Management Decision (DMRD) 971 which established the
Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). The DBOF provides a mechanism for
implementing the unit cost concept and is discussed at length.
Chapter IV discussed the unit cost implementation effort in the Navy and provided
a wide range of management comments reflecting the views of a variety of users.
Specifically addressed is implementation in the supply and medical functions. The
recruiting function is briefly addressed.
Chapter V presented an economic analysis of the unit cost within a microeconomic
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framework. The chapter addressed the application of microeconomic principles to three
broad unit cost objectives. The objectives are assessed from the microeconomic
viewpoint as to whether the unit cost concept objectives will be achieved.
In Chapter VI, the issue of Base Operations Support (BOS) cost allocations is
discussed. The focus of this chapter was the presentation of distortions that result from
indirect allocation methods and the current business thinking on overcoming these
distortions. The chapter provided a simplified description of the OSD-selected
BOS cost allocation method.
Chapter VTJ discussed the DMDC-developed unit cost programs which allocated
the BOS costs and analyzed data collected from field activities. An alternate allocation
scheme is developed and compared to illustrative allocations obtained with the OSD-
selected allocation method.
B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The need to change the basic way DoD does business is motivated by the
decreasing resource environment and the need to gain control over the costs of the
Department operations and support functions. OSD leaders and others believe that the
solution to DoD efficiency problems is to encourage a more business-like environment
within DoD. The OSD leadership claims the unit cost resourcing system achieves this
objective. What is most significant about the unit cost concept is that it is a ubiquitous
DoD-wide effort to improve resource management. While some critics may balk at the
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concept, it is likely that any attempt at improving DoD resource management is better
than none. To this end, the advantages and limitations of the unit cost concept should
be recognized.
Among the advantages, the unit cost concept:
(1) Communicates more information to users (producers and consumers)
about costs;
(2) Attempts to focus management attention on the relationship between cost
and output and avoid the "use it or lose it mentality" at support production activities;
(3) Makes DoD activity funding fluid with demand;
(4) Strives to improve decision making at all levels;
(5) Holds managers accountable for their decisions by providing a set earning
rate;
In its current form, some major limitations exist in the unit cost concept that in
many cases are the basis of management objection. The unit cost concept:
(1) Treats all costs as variable costs;
(2) Relies on non-standard accounting systems and data sources in which the
data validity (cost accounting information) is questionable and therefore may provide
questionable unit cost goal information;
(3) Recognizes a limited number of outputs;
(4) Indirectly allocates G&A costs on a single basis with a high degree of
data aggregation which likely introduces significant distortion;
(5) Considers only the average total cost and not the marginal cost of output;
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(6) Over constrains managers by: (a) setting output price; (b) requiring
organizations satisfy all levels of demand at the unit cost price; (c) requiring managers
to breakeven; (d) allocating costs to functions that may be unrelated to the function; and,
(e) potentially evaluating managers using unit cost goals attainment as a performance
measure. These constraints could provide incentives for managers to cut quality which
may go undetected in the short run and have serious long term consequences.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Overall, the Navy has not strongly supported the unit cost implementation
effort. Navy officials have provided little guidance to implement the unit cost concept
into a workable system satisfactory to Navy financial officials. Instead, Navy actions
indicate that some senior officials believe unit cost is a low priority subject. Given this,
and the lack of Navy guidance on unit cost, it is not surprising to find confusion and
uncertainty regarding installation of the unit cost system within the Department of the
Navy.
However, Navy officials should not solely shoulder the blame for poor Navy
support. The OSD method of managing the unit cost implementation may not have been
optimal. Forming task forces that are expected to resolve massive organizational,
procedural, accounting or other problems in a short period is problematic at best. The
issues associated with the unit cost concept require careful, considered and deliberative
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management solutions. Superficially, unit cost represent a new procedure or accounting
system. In reality, the unit cost concept is an entirely new management philosophy
which runs counter to deeply embedded cultural norms.
Regardless of how high a priority Navy officials place on the unit cost
implementation, it is clear that the unit cost concept will be implemented at the
component level. Therefore, it would appear advantageous for the Navy to consider
a more active role in transforming the unit cost system into a useful managerial tool.
Functional commanders (e.g., NAVSUP, BUMED) need to coordinate with
command level activities to determine the exact data/information local managers need in
order to manage against work load goals. All managers must realize that their future
resources will be a product of the unit cost system. Managers should focus on
maximizing command efficiency but must also understand the unit cost concept and how
it effects their operations. Managers should become familiar with how unit cost may
distort data and strive to implement command level unit cost systems that will enable
them to make good decisions consistent with efficiency improvement and quality
maintenance.
There may be some functions that OSD should review in the near future to
determine if the unit cost effort will provide a sufficient cost effective benefit. For
example, the Navy recruiting area was briefly examined. This area constitutes a
relatively small portion of the Navy budget. Given the function, cost structure, and




The economic analysis indicates that using unit cost information focuses
management attention on the average total cost of production, and not the marginal
costs. This focus can provide misleading information possibly resulting in "poor"
decisions. The Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-ll indicates that fixed
costs and variable costs be differentiated to develop the marginal cost. OSD should
seriously consider some method to incorporate the calculation of marginal cost data.
Although this suggestion constitutes a considerable undertaking, the benefits could be
significant.
If defense producers are assumed to be more business-like, and to become
competitive firms, then producers are compelled to become more efficient in order to
achieve profit or gain sharing. Additionally, consumers will reduce consumption because
producers have incentive to eliminate free riding and prices to consumers will increase.
These points serve to support the logic of the unit cost concept.
A personnel evaluation system tied to attaining unit cost goals as the concept is
currently being implemented may provide the incentives to managers to "game" the unit
cost system. This measure could possibly result in lower quality output or defeat the
purpose of the system.
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E. BOS COST ALLOCATION
The BOS allocation problem is of significant concern. Almost $26.5 billion
dollars was spent on BOS costs in FY 1990. This amount represents a significant
portion of the DoD budget. For simplicity, data availability and because "personnel" are
a common denominator among commands, "personnel" was chosen as the sole allocation
basis. The OSD guidance indicates that there may be better ways to allocate G&A and
BOS costs. However, the UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE places the burden
on the components to determine alternate methods, subject to OSD approval.
The data analyzed indicated that developing alternative allocation methods
could tend to reduce data distortions. Using distorted data would appear to run counter
to the objective of increasing cost awareness. The question is, "What good is increased
cost awareness if the costs are wrong?" Considering this is important because if unit
cost information is to be the basis by which manager make decisions, then they should
be provided accurate data. However, it must be realized that data accuracy has a price,
and there is no clear indication what the acceptable level of accuracy should be for
different echelons of management.
A review of the field data and DMDC reports indicated that significant data
distortion occurs as a result of the host-tenant relationships DMDC has programmed for
the Navy allocation part of the unit cost system. Specifically, many instances were
observed in which the activities that incurred the costs were not related to the activities
receiving the benefit. This is may be the result from the calibre of support provided to
DMDC when they were initially programming the Navy host-tenant relationships.
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Another example of this problem was observed at supply activities that do not allocate
BOS costs. This is a result of the Cost Account Code (CAC) mapping agreement
between DMDC and NAVSUP. DMDC should consider reviewing Navy installation
host-tenant relationships to improve the allocation with Navy support. Additionally,
NAVSUP should consider reviewing the current structure and decide if it is appropriate
for their host activities to allocate BOS costs to tenants. If so, a new CAC mapping
needs to be determined.
Lastly, it was noted that the current accounting system does not provide
sufficient information for the DMDC computer program to properly handle reimbursable
funding. Unfortunately, the resolution to this problem will likely need to wait for the
new accounting system. However, this point raises the issue of whether activities should
negotiate Inter-service Support Agreements (ISAs). In doing so it appears as though
some tenants may be subsidizing others. An alternative supported by this paper is for
a host to establish ISAs with all tenants and to request DMDC exclude them from
automatic BOS allocation. This would minimize the distortion introduced by the current
allocation method.
F. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The unit cost concept provides a rich topic for future research. This section
provides areas that should be considered for future research. They are discussed in the
order the thesis was organized.
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1. UNIT COST IMPLEMENTATION
(1) Implementation Strategy Comparison Study . The objective of this
research would be to determine if there are useful strategies the other components have
used in implementing the unit cost concept that the Navy could adopt. It was mentioned
during interviews conducted for this thesis that the Air Force and particularly the Army
have applied significant resources in implementing the unit cost concept. As evidence,
the Army produced the only known training aid regarding the unit cost concept.
(2) Implementation and Effectiveness Follow-Up Study . This study could
be designed to assess the Navy and overall DoD implementation progress. One focus
for this research could be to measure management attitudes towards the unit cost concept.
If possible, this effort should be done before the accounting system is in place, and then
a similar study after implementation. Comparing the results could provide information
on the effectiveness of the unit cost concept as a resource allocation system and
determine if the unit cost concept is achieving the stated goals.
(3) Other Functional Areas Study . This thesis discussed supply, medical,
and recruiting functions. Unit cost will be implemented in many others as experience
is gained and accounting systems are developed. Research in these other areas to identify
problems and potential solutions would be useful.
(4) Organizational Change Study . This study could examine an organization
that has implemented the unit cost concept and identify if the organization has become
more efficient, decreased costs and provides the same or better service before the unit
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cost concept were implemented. In addition, organizational or management changes could
be identified that occurred as a result of operating under the unit cost system.
2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1) Economic Efficiency Analysis Study . Using actual costs, a study could
be conducted to measure economic efficiency at an organization operating under unit cost
concept. This could be contrasted with the technical efficiency to determine overall
improvement and to identify if using marginal cost information would have changed
management decisions.
(2) A General Equilibrium Analysis Study . One area this thesis did not
address was the concept of equilibrium under the unit cost concept. This study
could address if it is even possible for DoD to attain an equilibrium state (i.e., were
supply equals demand).
(3) Consumer Behavior and DoD Savings Study . The question is whether
the changes to the budgeting system and price changes have sufficiently changed
consumer habits. Can consumers obtain what they need, but in smaller quantities thus
promoting DoD savings?
3. BOS ALLOCATION METHODS
(1) Information Distortion Study . This thesis highlighted that unit cost
information is distorted. A detailed study of data aggregation and allocation could
identify the specific information distortions introduced by the unit cost system. This
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could provide valuable new information so that managers can consider the effects of
distortions when making decisions.
(2) Cost-Benefit Study . There is no question that BOS costs can be more
accurately allocated across missions or users in an effort to reduce distortion. However,
costs increase with accuracy. This research could analyze the cost-benefits of increased
accuracy and recommend which areas would benefit in the most cost effective manner.
Also it is unlikely that one allocation scheme would be appropriate for all activities.
Therefore, the study could suggest if the optimal allocation strategy is to "tailor" a
scheme for each installation, or to design an improved standardized allocation scheme.
(3) Allocation Methods Study . This thesis provided an example alternative
allocation method based on a relatively small data base. Further study could determine
an appropriate method for allocating BOS costs. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to
"tailor" an allocation scheme on an irstallation by installation basis.
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APPENDIX A
THE UNIT COST SYSTEM DESIGN
This Appendix provides a graphic presentation of the unit cost system design,
allocation process and report generation. The graphic was provided by the Defense



































































































































Host Provides host services to many Norfolk,
commands. At DMDC request.
Navy Ships Parts Control
Center
Mechanicsburg, PA
ICP Close to Washington, D.C.
Oaknoll Naval Hospital 1
Oakland, CA




Depot Close to Monterey. Consolidated
Tracey Army Depot, no physical
distribution.
San Diego Naval Supply
Center
San Diego, CA
Depot Has physical distribution.
San Diego Naval Station
CA
Host Provides host services to many San Diego,
commands.
'Data from this location is not specifically discussed, but information obtained was
included in the discussion on implementing unit cost in the medical area.
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APPENDIX C
Navy Inventory Control Point and Depot Mappin g
This Appendix provides the "mapping" of Navy Cost Account Costs to Unit Cost
Function for Inventor)' Control Points (ICPs) and Navy Supply Centers (depots) agreed
to by the Naval Supply Systems Command, Washington, D.C. and the Defense
Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
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NAVY ICP MAPPING
As of 25 Oct 91
(Used for New Design Reporting
For Periods July, August, and September)
ALL OPERATIONS ARE STOCK FUND
FUNCTIONS COST ACCOUNT CODES/SOURCE
ICP OPERATIONS
Inventory Control Point 2151*, 252*, 253*, 254*, 255*, 259*
Materiel Manual
Credit Returns Manual
Central Desing Activity 50% of UIC 00367 (FMSO)
Reimbursement to Depots Depot Workload § $25/line
Quality Engineering 26**, 290B
Large Purchase 271A, 271C, 217E, 271G, 2711, 273A
Small Purchase 271B, 271D, 271F, 271H, 271J, 274B




Init/Follow-on Prov 241A, 241D
Program Requirements 241B, 241E
Allowance Prod Purchases 241C, 241F, 242F, 243A
ICP OPERATIONS/UNIT COST
OTHER ICP OUTPUTS








As of 25 Oct 91



















29** not otherwise specified,































7 * * *
8 * * *









As Of 25 Oct 91
(Used for New Design Reporting
For Periods July, August, and September)













50% of UIC 00367
(FMSO on ICP File)
212E
OTHER DEPOT OUTPUTS

























271A, 271C, 271E, 271G,
2700, 2710






1C4A, 1C4B, 1C4K, 1C4L
6E**





































































7 * * *






















** FOR ALL CAC SERIES **
** FOR ALL CAC SERIES **
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APPENDIX D
San Diego, Naval Station and the Example Alternative Allocation Method
This Appendix provides the data used to develop the example allocation method
results. The data reflects information provided by the staff and Comptroller of San
Diego Naval Station (SDNS) and reports provided by the Defense Manpower Data
Center, Monterey, California. The data includes:
Item Description
(1) Naval Station, San Diego Summary Data
(2) DMDC versus SDNS People Graph
(3) Command, Personnel, and Transport Cost Categories grouped by
CACs
(4) Real Property and Security Cost Categories grouped by CACs
(5) Allocation Using "People" Assigned
(6) Alternate Allocation Basis (% by cost category) using DMDC
"People" numbers
(7) Alternate Allocation Basis (% by cost category) using SDNS
"People" numbers
(8) Allocated Cost (on alternate basis) using DMDC "People"
(9) Allocated Cost (on alternate basis) using SDNS "People"
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1 00030 0.009? 11 0.119? 0.009?
00242 18388 0.409? 32 0.329? 0.009?
3 00244 282669 6 . 15 * 258 2.609? 0.00 9?
4 00245 2481469 53 97 9C 874 8.819? 1469 13.869?
5 00247 190861 4 151 627 6 329? 0.009?
6 00259 25920 0.56 St 0.009? 0.00 9f
7 0025 A 8696 0.199? 129 1.309? 100 0.94 9?
8 05 46A 14301 0.319? 53 0.539? 51 0.489?
9 13871 800 0.029? 116 1.17% 119 1.129?
10 31557 13720 0.30* 0.009? 6 0.06 9?
11 35612 50551 1.10* 4 004% 0.009?
12 35720 009? 31 0.31% 29 0.279?
13 39049 5680 0.129? 18 0.18% 0.009?
14 39354 64416 1.409? 56 0.56% 54 0.519?
15 42980 0.009? 45 0.45 9? 18 0.179?
16 43435 0.00 9? 50 0.50% 0.009?
17 45020 50800 1.109? 100 1.01% 266 2.519?
18 46276 0.00 9? 30 0.39% 0.009?
19 52739 261 0.019? 0.0O 9? 42 0.409?
20 53824 159443 3.479? 67 0.68% 0.00%
21 53^97 18781 0.419? 21 0.21% 34 0.329?
22 55304 12508 0.279? 91 0.92% 79 0.75%
23 57040 0.00 9? 4 0.04 9? 0.009?
24 60681 9280 0.209? 0.00% 0.009?
25 61690 418958 9.119? 588 5.939? 71 0.679?
26 62706 35043 0.769? 70 0.71% 0.009?
27 628K8 0.005? 46 0.46 9? 12 0.119?
28 627V
1
39419 0.8*9? 616 6.219? 614 5.79%
29 63015 17555 0.389? 9 0.00% 0.009?
30 63057 18^72 0.413 19 0.199? 0.009?
31 63387 17611 0.389? 2276 22.94'? 2481 23.419?
32 63394 700 0.029? 0.0*19? 0.009?
33 65913 0.009? 36 36 9? 0.00%
34 65584 14015 0.329? 255 2.57 9? 0.009?
3.S 65918 102o0 0.229? 1831 18.45% 1817 17.149?
36 66022 67126 1.46 9? 238 2.40% 474 4.471
37 66 1 05 3314i)6 7.219? 605 6.109? 167 1.58 9?
38 66804 12060 0.289? 22 0.229? 0.009?
39 68132 12960 0.289? 17 0.17%' 10 0.099?
40 68 103 0009? 45 0.45 9? 0.00%
41 68266 96490 2.109? 85 0.86 9? 0.009?
42 68335 0.009? 12 0.12% 0.00%
43 68370 45672 0.999? 94 0.95 9? 100 0.941
44 68407 0.00 9? 10 0.10% 11 0.109?
45 68439 16016 0.35 9? 14 0.14* 0.009?
46 68482 0.009? 18 0.18% 17 0.169?
47 68553 448 0.019? 157 1.58% 0.00%
48 68562 25920 0.56 9? 142 1.43 9? 52 0.499?
49 68711 0.009? 20 0.209? 0.009?
50 70240 7220 0.16% 25 0.25 9? 0.009?
51 82630 0.009? 46 0.46% 5 0.05 9?
52 OTHUIC 0.009? 0.009? 2501 23.609?
TOTAL 4S9822S iu(uw% *W22 WW.MS 10599 WM*
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Command, Adm in and Service Support
DIRECT DIRECT
CAC LABOR NONLAB TOTAL
1A** Com, PAO, Legal $552,236 $455,324 $1,007,560
1B10 Mgt Ops 156,722 5,998 162,720
IC** Comptroller 1,266,674 63,358 1,330,032
IH** ADP 397,858 1,012,983 1,410,841
U** Admin Office Ser 345,688 53,650 399,338
1R** Misc 71,314 1,298 72,612
IX** Ledger Accts 228,735 228,735
18** Audio-Vis Support 18,952 18,952
6A** Communications 1,273,689 1,273,689

















TOTAL $3,220,370 $8,014,351 $11,234,721


















TOTAL $0 $3,138,007 $3,138,007
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Real Property & Facility Maint and Ops and Minor Con
DIRECT DIRECT
CAC DESC LABOR NOHLAB TOTAL
70** Minor Con Costs $0 $1,269,298 $1,269,298
71 ** Building Maint 9,255,656 9,255,656
72** Waterfront Maint 2,370,296 2,370,296
7450 Grounds 6,712 6,712
75** Other Structures 614,602 614,602
76** Utility Plants 188,328 188,328
77** Utiltiy Distribution 334,836 334,836
78** Preventative Maint 903,462 903,462
8260 Steam and Water 1,879,326 1,879,326
83** Electricity 3,096,352 3,096,352
85** Sewage 638,870 638,870
87** Other utilties 376,914 376,914
91** Eng'ing and Admin 774 286 1,843,374 2,617,660
Q">** Oth PW Shop Ops 5,291,849 5,291,849
9320 Rentals 74,758 74,758
TOTAL $774 .286 $28,144,633 "$28,918,919















TOTAL $6,408A 12 $892,756 $7,300,868
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1 00030 11 0.11* S62.723 O.Ou* so
2 00242 32 32* 182,467 0.00*
3 00244 258 2.60% 1,471,143 0.00*
4 00245 874 8 81* 4,983,640 1469 13.86* 7,841,359
5 00247 627 6.32* 3,575,220 0.00%
6 00259 0.00* 0.00*
7 002 5A 129 1.30* 735.572 100 0.94* 533,789
8 0546A 53 0.53* 302.212 51 0.48* 272,232
9 13871 116 1.17* 661,444 119 1.12* 635,209
10 31557 0.00* 6 0.06* 32,027
11 35612 4 0.04* 22.808 000*
12 35720 31 0.31* 176,765 29 0.27* 154,799
13 39049 18 0.18* 102,638 0.00*
14 39354 56 56* 319.318 54 0.51* 288,246
15 42980 45 0.45* 256,595 18 0.17* 96,082
16 43435 50 0.50* 285.105 0.00*
1? 45020 100 1.01* 570.211 266 2.51% 1,419,878
18 46276 39 0.39% 222.382 0.00*
19 52730 0.00 % 42 0.40* 224,191
20 53824 67 0.68* 382.041 0.00*
21 53997 21 0.21* 119,744 34 0.32* 181,488
22 55304 91 0.92* 518.892 79 0.75* 421,693
23 57049 4 0.04* 22,808 0.0091
24 60681 0.00* 0.00*
25 61690 588 5.93* 3,352,838 71 0.67* 378,990
26 62706 70 0.71* 399,147 0.00*
27 62888 46 0.46* 262,297 12 0.11% 64,055
28 62791 616 6.21* 3,512,497 614 5.79% 3,277,464
29 63015 o 0.09* 51.319 o oo%
30 63057 19 0.19* 108.340 0.00%
31 63387 2276 22.94* 12.977,991 2481 23.41% 13,243,303
32 63394 0.00* 0.00%
33 65913 36 0.36* 205.276 0.00%
34 65584 255 2.57* 1,454,037 0.00*
35 65918 1831 18.4S* 10.440.554 1817 17.14% 9,698,944
36 66022 238 2.40* 1,357,101 474 4.47* 2,530,159
37 66105 605 6.10* 3,449,774 167 1.58% 891,427
38 66894 22 0.22* 125,446 0.00*
39 68132 17 0.17* 96,936 10 0.09% 53,379
40 68193 45 0.45* 256,595 0.00%
41 68266 85 0.86* 484,679 0.00%
42 68335 12 0.12* 68,425 0.00%
43 68370 94 0.95* 535.998 100 0.94% 533,789
44 68407 10 0.10* 57,021 11 0.10% 58,717
45 68439 14 0.14* 79,829 0.00*
46 68482 18 0.18* 102.638 17 0.16* 90,744
47 68553 157 1.58* 895.230 0.00*
48 68562 142 1.43* 809,699 52 0.49* 277,570
40 68711 20 0.20* 114,042 0.00*
50 70240 25 0.25* 142,553 0.00%
51 82630 46 0.46* 262,297 5 0.05% 26,689
52 OTHU1C 0.00* 2501 23.60% 13,350.061
TOTAL 9912 iWM% S56.57o.2S7 10599 109,60* $&&&3m
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1 00030 0.00 % 0.00% 0.003
2 00242 18388 0.40% 0.00% 18388 0.20%
3 00244 282669 6.15% 0.00% 282669 3.07%
4 00245 2481469 53.97% 1469 13.86% 3118774 33.91%
5 00247 190861 4.15% 0.00% 190861 2.08%
6 00259 25920 0.56% 0.00% 25920 0.28%
7 0025 A 8696 0.19% 100 0.94% 52080 0.57%
8 0546A 14301 0.31% 51 0.48% 36427 0.40%
9 13871 800 0.02% 119 1.12% 52426 0.57%
10 31557 13720 0.30% 6 0.06% 16323 0.18%
11 35612 50551 1.10% 0.00% 50551 0.55%
12 35720 0.00% 29 0.27% 12581 0.14%
13 39049 5680 0.12% 0.00% 5680 0.06%
14 39354 64416 1.40% 54 0.51% 87843 0.96%
15 42980 0.00% 18 0.17% 7809 0.08%
16 43435 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
17 45020 50800 1.10% 266 2.51% 166200 1.81%
18 46276 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
19 52739 261 0.01% 42 0.40% 18482 0.20%
20 53824 159443 3.47% 0.00% 159443 1.73%
21 53997 18781 0.41S 34 0.32% 33531 0.363
it 55304 12508 0.27% 79 0.75 9f 46781 0.513
23 57049 0.00% 00% 0.00%
24 60681 9280 0.20% 0.00% 9280 0.10%
25 61690 418Q58 9.11'* 71 67? 449760 4.89%
26 62706 35043 0.76% 0.00% 35043 0.38%
27 62888 0.00% 12 0.11% 5206 0.06%
28 62791 3^419 0.86% 614 5.79% 305794 3.33%
29 63015 17555 0.38% 0.00% 17555 0.19%
30 63057 18972 0.41% 0.00% 18972 0.213
31 63387 17611 0.38% 2481 23.41% 1093957 11.903
32 63394 700 0.02 % 0.00% 700 0.01%
33 65913 0.003 0.00
3
0.003
34 65584 14915 0.32S 0.00% 14915 0.163
35 65918 10290 0.22% 1817 17.14% 798570 8.683
36 6602: 67126 1 46% 474 4.47% 272764 2.97%
37 66 1 05 331406 7.219! 167 1.58% 403857 4.39%
38 66894 12^60 0.28% 000% 12960 0.143
39 68132 12960 0.28% 10 0.09% 17298 0.19%
40 68193 000% 0.00% 0.003
41 68266 96490 2.10% 0.00% 96490 1 .05 3
42 68335 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
43 68370 45672 0.99% 100 0.94% 89056 0.97%
44 68407 0.00% 11 0.10% 4772 0.05%
45 68439 16016 0.35% 0.00% 16016 0.173
46 68482 0.00% 17 16% 7375 0.083
47 68553 448 0.01% 0.00% 448 0.003
48 68562 25920 0.56% 52 0.49% 48479 0.53%
4^ 68711 0.00 3 0.00% 0.00%
50 70240 7220 0.16% 0.00% 7220 0.08%
51 82630 000% 5 0.05% 2169 0.02%
52 OTHUIC 0.003 2501 23.60% 1085023 11.803
TOTAL 4598225 tmjxm 10599 100.00% 919644* 100.00%
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1 00030 $3,230 $12,455 $3,479 $0 $4,047 $23,211
2 00242 21,049 36,234 10,121 116,270 26,371 $210,045
3 00244 254,877 292,134 81,597 1,787,364 319,327 $2,735,299
4 00245 1,829,042 989.634 276.418 15,690,745 2,291,542 $21,077,381
5 00247 305,062 709,955 198,300 1,206,846 382,202 $2,802,365
6 00259 16,424 163,897 20,577 $200,898
7 0025 A 43,392 146,067 40,799 54,986 54,364 $339,608
8 0546 A 24,626 60,012 16,762 90,428 30,853 $222,681
9 13871 34,571 131,347 36,687 5,059 43,313 $250,977
10 31557 8,694 86,754 10,892 $106,340
11 35612 33,206 4,529 1,265 319,642 41,603 $400,245
12 35720 9,104 35,101 9,804 11,406 $65,415
13 39049 8,885 20,381 5,693 35,916 11,132 $82,007
14 39354 57,262 63.409 17,711 407,313 71,741 $617,436
15 42980 13,215 50.954 14,232 16,556 $94,957
16 43435 14,683 56,615 15,813 18.396 $105,507
17 45020 61,555 113,230 31,627 321,217 77,121 $604,750
18 46276 1 1 ,453 44.160 12,334 14,349 $82,296
19 52739 165 1,650 207 $2,022
20 53824 120.706 75,864 21,190 1,008,185 151,228 $1,377,173
21 539^7 18,067 23,778 6,642 118,755 22,636 $189,878
22 55304 34,649 103,040 28,780 79,090 43,410 $288,969
23 57049 1,175 4,529 1 ,265 1,472 $8,441
24 6068] 5.880 58,679 7,367 $71,926
25 61690 438,144 665.795 185,965 2,649,142 548,935 $4,487,981
26 62706 42.761 79,261 22.139 221,583 53,574 $419,318
27 62888 13.508 52.086 14.548 16.924 $97,066
28 6279 i 205,871 697,499 194,821 249,253 257,928 $1,605,372
29 63015 13.767 10,191 2,846 111,003 17,248 $155,055
30 63057 17.601 21,514 6,009 119,963 22.052 $187,139
31 63387 679,524 2,577,124 719,825 111,357 851,351 $4,939,181
32 63394 444 4,426 556 $5,426
33 65913 10,572 40,763 11,386 13,245 $75,966
34 65584 84.334 288.738 80.648 94,310 105,659 $653,689
35 65918 544,207 2,073,249 579,086 65,065 681,818 $3,943,425
36 66022 112,425 269.488 75,272 424,449 140,853 $1,022,487
37 66105 387,659 685.044 191,342 2,095,536 485,684 $3,845,265
38 66894 14,673 24.911 6,958 81,948 18,383 $146,873
39 68132 13,204 19,249 5,377 81,948 16,543 $136,321
40 68193 13,215 50.954 14,232 16,556 $94,957
41 68266 86,102 96,246 26.883 610,122 107,874 $927,227
42 68335 3,524 13,588 3,795 4,415 $25,322
43 68370 56.544 106,437 29,729 288,792 70,842 $552,344
44 68407 2,936 11,323 3,163 3,679 $21,101
45 68439 14,260 15,852 4,428 101,272 17,865 $153,677
46 68482 5,286 20.381 5,693 6,623 $37,983
47 68553 46,388 177,772 49,654 2,833 58,118 $334,765
48 68562 58,124 160,787 44,910 163,897 72,821 $500,539
49 68711 5,873 22,646 6,325 7,358 $42,202
50 70240 11.916 28,308 7,907 45,653 14,930 $108,714
51 82630 13,508 52,086 14,548 16,924 $97,066
52 OTHU1C $0
TOTAL $5,827,342 $11,134,720 $3,138,003 S29. 075JM 8 $7300,871' $56.576 r2B8
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1 0003 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 00242 18388 0.40% 0.00% 18388 0.20*
3 00244 282669 6.15% 0.00% 282669 3.07*
4 00245 2481469 53.97% 1469 13.86% 3118774 33.91*
5 00247 190861 4.15% 0.00% 190861 2.08*
6 00259 25920 0.56% 0.00% 25920 0.28%
7 0025A 8696 0.19% 100 0.94% 52080 0.57%
8 0546A 14301 0.31% 51 0.48% 36427 0.40%
9 13871 800 0.02 * 119 1.12% 52426 0.57%
10 31557 13720 0.30% 6 0.06% 16323 0.18*
11 35612 50551 1.10% 0.00% 50551 0.55%
12 35720 0.00% 29 0.27% 12581 0.14%
13 39049 5680 0.12% 0.00% 5680 0.06%
14 30354 64416 1.40% 54 0.51% 87843 0.96%
15 42980 0.00% 18 0.17% 7809 0.08*
16 43435 0.00% 0.00% 0.00*
17 45020 5«> *> 1.10% 266 2.51% 166200 1.81*
18 46276 0.00% 000% 0.00*
19 52739 261 0.01% 42 0.40% 18482 0.20*
20 53824 159443 3.47% 0.00* 159443 1.73*
21 53997 18781 0.41% 34 0.32* 33531 0.36*
22 55304 12508 0.27% 79 0.75* 46781 0.51*
23 57049 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
24 60681 9280 0.20% 0.00% 9280 0.10*
25 61690 418958 9. IIS 71 0.67% 449760 4.89*
26 62706 35043 0.76* 0.00% 35043 0.38*
27 62888 0.00* 12 0.11% 5206 0.06*
28 62791 39419 0.86* 614 5.79* 305794 3.33*
29 63015 17555 0.38% 0.00* 17555 0.19*
30 63057 18972 0.41% 0.00% 18972 0.21*
31 63387 17611 0.38 % 2481 23.41% 1093957 11.90*
32 633«4 0.02* 0.00% 700 0.01*
33 65913 0.00* 0.00% 0.00*
34 65584 14915 32% 0.00% 14915 0.16*
35 65918 10290 0.22% 1817 17.14% 798570 8.68*
36 66022 67126 1.46% 474 4.47* 272764 2.97*
37 66 1 05 331406 7.21% 167 1.58* 403857 4.39*
38 66S94 12960 0.28% 0.00% 12960 0.14*
39 68132 12«60 0.28% 10 0.09% 17298 0.19*
40 68193 00% 0.00% 0.00*
41 68266 96490 2 10% 0.00% 96490 1.05*
42 68335 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
43 68370 45672 0.99% 100 0.94% 89056 0.97*
44 68407 0.00* 11 0.10% 4772 0.05*
45 68439 16016 0.35* 0.00% 16016 0.17%
46 68482 0.00* 17 0.16% 7375 0.08%
47 68553 448 01* 0.00% 448 0.00%
48 68562 25920 0.56* 52 0.49* 48479 0.53*
49 68711 0.00% 0.00* 0.00*
50 70240 7220 0.16% 0.00% 7220 0.08*
51 82630 0.00% 5 0.05% 2169 0.02*
52 OTHU1C 00* 2501 23.60% 1085023 11.80*
TOTAL 459S21S 100.001? 105*9 100.00% <M<*44S 100.00%
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Allocated Costs (Using DMDC People 1)
Hwiii nmvm ippiWmSSl fill
i 00030 SO so so so SO so
2 0O242 11,652 116.270 14,598 $142420
3 0O244 179,114 1,787,364 224,405 $2,190,883
4 00245 1,976.215 1,557,110 434,921 15,690,745 2,475.930 $22,134,921
5 00247 120,939 1,206,846 151,521 $1,479306
6 00259 16,424 163.897 20,577 $200,898
7 0O25A 33,001 105,998 29,607 54,986 41.345 $264,937
8 0546A 23,082 54,059 15,099 90,428 28,919 $211487
9 13871 33,220 126,138 35,232 5,059 41,620 $241,269
10 31557 10,343 6,360 1,776 86,754 12,958 $118,191
11 35612 32,032 319,642 40,131 $391,805
12 35720 7,972 30,739 8,586 9,988 $57,285
13 39049 3,599 35,916 4,509 $44,024
14 39354 55,662 57,239 15,988 407.313 69,737 $605,939
15 42980 4,948 19,080 5329 6,199 $35456
16 43435 $0
17 45020 105,313 Ml,955 78,754 321.217 131,943 $919,182
18 46276 $0
19 52739 11,711 44,519 12,435 1.650 14,672 $84,987
20 53824 101,031 1,008,185 126.578 $1,235,794
21 53997 21,247 36,039 10,066 118,755 26,620 $212,727
22 55304 29,643 83,738 23389 79,090 37,138 $252,998
23 57049 $0
24 60681 5,880 58,679 7,367 $71,926
25 61690 284,991 75,259 21,021 2,649,142 357,055 $3,387,468
26 62706 22,205 221,583 27,820 $271,608
27 62888 3,299 12,720 3^53 4,133 $23,705
28 62791 193,767 650,827 181,785 249,253 242,763 $1,518395
29 63015 11,124 111,003 13,937 $136,064
30 63057 12,022 119,963 15,061 $147,046
31 63387 693,187 2,629,809 734.541 111,357 868,470 $5,037364
32 63394 444 4,426 556 $5,426
33 65913 $0
34 65584 9,451 94,310 11,841 $115,602
35 65918 506,015 1,925,982 537.953 65,065 633,968 $3,668,983
36 66022 172,837 502.430 140335 424,449 216,542 $1.456493
37 66105 255,905 177,017 49,443 2,095,536 320,614 $2,898415
38 66894 8,212 81,948 10,289 $100,449
39 68132 10,961 10,600 2.961 81,948 13,733 $120,203
40 68193 $0
41 68266 61,141 610,122 76,601 $747,864
42 68335 $0
43 68370 56,430 105,998 29,607 288,792 70,700 $551427
44 68407 3,024 11.660 3,257 3,788 $21,729
45 68439 10,149 101,272 12,715 $124,136
46 68482 4,673 18,020 5,033 5,855 $33481
47 68553 284 2,833 356 $3,473
48 68562 30,719 55,119 15395 163,897 38,486 $303,616
49 68711 $0
50 70240 4,575 45,653 5,732 $55,960
51 82630 1,374 5,300 1,480 1.722 $9,876
52 OTHU1C 687,526 2,651,008 740.462 861,377 $4,940,373
TOTAL $5327,34*' $J 1,234.723 : $3434.00* $79,075 34J* 1WimW* $5^476^1
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APPENDIX E
San Diego Naval Supply Center Data
This Appendix provides a summary of the data collected at the San Diego Naval
Supply Center. The data was used to analyze reports provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, Monterey, California and to examine the OSD directed method of allocating
BOS costs. The data includes:
Item Description
(1) Summary SDNS data
(2) DMDC versus SDNS People Graph
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Naval Supply Center, San Diego (UIC N00244)
0001A 0.08% 3.04% 0.00%
00037 3533 0.28% 0.21% 0.00%
00123 28301 2.27% 93 6.42% 179 3.71%
00242 26276 2.11% 60 4.14% 358 7.42%
00244 927701 74.35% 473 32.67% 1741 36.08%
00245 1835 0.15% 0.14% 0.00%
0O61A 0.00% 0.62% 0.19%
35612 29077 2.33% 0.28% 0.17%
43435 3733 0.30% 0.41% 0.12%
10 45189 2280 0.18% 10 0.69% 0.15%
11 60957 72293 5.79% 427 29.49% 427 8.85%
12 61339 25562 2.05% 24 1.66% 0.00%
13 62706 1032 0.08% 0.21% 0.00%
14 63015 37352 2.99% 113 7.80% 228 4.72%
15 66022 1816 0.15% 0.21% 0.00%
16 67796 1053 0.08% 0.07% 0.02%
11
18
68152 3029 0.24% 0.28% 0.15%
68350 27986 2.24% 39 2.69% 24 0.50%
19 68553 7478 0.60% 39 2.69% 379 7.85%
20 70240 4645: 3.72% 91 6.28% 416 8.62%
21 OTHUIC 0.00% 0.00% 1036 21.47%
TOTAL 1247764 100.00^ 1448
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13. Commanding Offcier
Naval Station, San Diego
Comptroller
San Diego, California 92136-5000
Attn: Ms. S. Muller
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c.l The DoD unit cost
initiative.
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